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Challenging and Refining the
"Unwilling or Unable" Doctrine
CraigMartin*
ABSTRACT

This Article challenges and proposes refinements to the
"unwilling or unable" doctrine. Governments after 9/11 have
invoked the doctrine to justify the use of force in self-defense
against non-state actors (NSAs) operatingwithin the territory of
nonconsenting states. Responding to criticism that it lacked
substance and a legal foundation, Daniel Bethlehem famously
developed more detailedprinciples to embed the policy firmly in
law, strike a balance between the interests of target states and
territorialstates, and bridge the gap between scholars and policy
makers. His principles were embraced by governments as
reflecting custom. The effort was laudable, but the principlesfell
short of theirobjective, and they create a risk of destabilizing the
jus ad bellum regime.
This Article notes that the principles do not reflect custom,
and it examines some of the ways in which they are inconsistent
with the established understandingof the jus ad bellum regime.
Specifically, they: lower the threshold for what constitutes an
armed attack; eviscerate the temporal component from the
concept of imminence, thereby destabilizing the core principle of
necessity; improperly import the law of state responsibility into
the jus ad bellum analysis; and undermine the independence of
the internationalhumanitarianlaw (IHL) and the jus ad bellum
regimes. Finally, the principles do not provide sufficient guidance
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on how or by whom a range of key determinationsare to be made,
particularly regarding the "ability" or "unwillingness" of the
territorial state. The principles lump all these determinations
together and suggest that they may all be made unilaterally by
the target state, governed only by a single, low reasonableness
standard.All of this weakens the constraints of the jus ad bellum
regime more generally, thus raisingthe risk of inter-state war.
The Article takes seriously the operational imperatives in
dealing with the threat posed by terrorist organizations but
proposes refinements to the principles to address each of these
problems, so as to achieve greater consistency with established
principles of the jus ad bellum regime. It develops new ideas on
imminence, and drawing upon theories of self-judgment in
internationallaw, it disaggregatesthe decisions that have to be
made and proposes differentiated standards to govern their
execution and later assessment.
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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001 (the 9/11 attacks), the United States and other
Western states developed legal justifications for the use of force against
transnational terrorist organizations operating from within the
territory of weak or sympathetic states. The primary justification
articulated by the United States for using lethal force against members
of the terrorist organizations themselves, as distinct from the states
within which they were operating, has been that the United States is
in a "transnational non-international armed conflict" with al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, and associated forces. 1 This formulation soon
encompassed such disparate groups as al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabab, Boko Haram, and Daesh (also known as
the Islamic State in Syria or ISIS), to name a few. 2 But this
justification, even if accepted as entirely valid, only provided authority
under international humanitarian law (IHL) for the use of lethal force

1.
Initially the United States argued that the conflict with al-Qaeda and
associated forces constituted a war to which the law of armed conflict did not apply, but
the Supreme Court rejected such arguments and held that it was a non-international
armed conflict to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied. See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006). It was subsequently called a
"transnational non-international armed conflict," or an "internationalized noninternational armed conflict," in an attempt to distinguish it from the traditional
understanding of non-international armed conflict as being internal to a state. See
generally David E. Graham, Defining Non-InternationalArmed Conflict: A Historically
Difficult Task, 88 NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 43 (2012). This distinction has been roundly rejected, however. See generally
KUBo MACAK, INTERNATIONALIZED ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018);
Anne Quintin, Symposium: Reflections on Conflict Classification, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 16,
2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/01/16/symposium-reflections-on-conflict-classification/
[https://perma.cc/YXC9-H6NP] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
2.
THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES' USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL
SECURITY
OPERATIONS
3-7
(2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/framework.ReportFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63VE-2MXC]
(archived Feb. 5, 2019) [hereinafter US LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS]. For analysis
of the US LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS Report, see Benjamin Wittes, The White
House Releases a "Report on the Legal Policy Frameworks"on American Use of Military
Force, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/white-house-releasesreport-legal-and-policy-frameworks-american-uses-military-force
[https://perma.cclQK6V-VLXB] (archived Feb. 5, 2019); see also Rebecca Ingber, CoBelligerency, 42 YALE J. INT'L L. 67, 68 (2017); Robert Chesney, A Daisy Chain of
Associated Forces? On the Potential Use of Force in Niger Against al-Mourabitoun,
LAWFARE (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/daisy-chain-associated-forcespotential-use-force-niger-against-al-mourabitoun
[https://perma.ce/3TZS-57NW]
(archived Feb. 5, 2019).
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against the members of these armed groups in certain circumstances.
It did not answer growing objections that firing missiles at people
within the territory of other sovereign states, without the consent of
3
those states, violated the international law rights of those states. It
was argued that such strikes constituted a use of force against the
nonconsenting state, and unless it came within one of the two
permissible exceptions, was in violation of the prohibition on the use of
force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. 4 A
justification grounded in the jus ad bellum regime, which governs the
use of force against states, was thus needed to accompany the IHL
rationales in defense of the lethal operations against non-state armed
groups (NSAs). 5
The United States, soon followed by other states, turned to an old
doctrine from the pre-UN system of international law, now famously
known as the "unwilling or unable" doctrine, to justify this use of force
against NSAs operating within nonconsenting states. 6 While the
doctrine has its origin in much older neutrality law, 7 it was
reformulated to apply to the circumstances of states that are the
victims of armed attacks (referred to here as target states) mounted by
8
NSAs from within the territory of some other state (territorial states).
The updated doctrine suggested that the target states have the right,
under the doctrine of self-defense in the jus ad bellum regime, to use
force against the NSAs within that territorial state in response to

There. is a massive literature on this issue. See, e.g., Philip Alston (Special
3.
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions), Study on Targeted
Killings, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 12-15 (May 28, 2010) [hereinafter Alston Study];
NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 25-42
(2005); NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-55 (2008); Craig

Martin, Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defence, and the Jus ad Bellum Regime,
in TARGETED KILLING: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD (Claire

Finkelstein & Jens Ohlin eds., 2012) [hereinafter Martin Going Medieval]; Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones:A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009,
in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAw GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt
ed., 2012); TOM RUYS, 'ARMED ATTACK' AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 368-510 (2010); Christof Heyns et al.,

The InternationalLaw Framework Regulating the Use of Drones, 65 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
791, 800-05 (2016); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: ExtraJudicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 186-88
(2005).

Martin, Going Medieval, supra note 3, at 224.
4.
See infra Part II.C & D, for details of this development.
5.
Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Who is on Board with "Unwilling or
6.
Unable"?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwillingor-unable [https://perma.cc/QTE4-BLLGI (archived Feb. 27, 2019).
Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Frameworkfor
7.
ExtraterritorialSelf-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 505 (2012) [hereinafter Deeks
Unwilling].
See infra Part II.C.
8.
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imminent or actual armed attacks, so long as the territorial state is
unwilling or unable to prevent the NSA attacks, and is unwilling to
consent to the target state using force to do so itself.9
The killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan may be the most
famous instance of such a use of force against members of an NSA
located in a nonconsenting state (though there remains controversy
over whether Pakistan had secretly consented to the raid).1 0 But the
targeted killing program of the United States has involved missile
strikes against members of organized armed groups and terrorist
organizations in the tribal regions of Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, Libya, and Mali, to name just the best known theatres."
These were countries in which the United States was not yet involved
as a belligerent in an ongoing armed conflict (in contrast to its role in
Afghanistan and post-occupation Iraq), and in many instances the
governments of these territorial states objected to the strikes.1 2 The
United States thus required some jus ad bellum justification for the
use of force, and it increasingly invoked the unwilling or unable
doctrine, as part of a broader claim of self-defense, for this purpose.' 3

9.
See infra Part II.D.
10.
Cora Currier et al., What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden
Raid, THE INTERCEPT (May 18, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowdenosama-bin-laden-raid/ [https://perma.cc/5PJN-4E8N] (archived Feb. 5, 2019); Husain
Haqqani, What PakistanKnew About the Bin Laden Raid, FOREIGN POLICY (May 31,
2015),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/13/what-pakistan-knew-about-the-bin-ladenraid-seymour-hersh/ [https://perma.cc/ALG9-VCAS] (archived Feb. 5, 2019); Seymour M.
Hersh, The Killing of Osama Bin Laden, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS (May 21, 2015),
https://www.1rb.co.uk/v37/nlO/seymour-m-hersh/the-killing-of-osama-bin-laden
[https://perma.cc/F3NK-BFEV] (archived Feb. 5, 2019); Eric Schmitt et al., U.S. Was
Braced for Fight With Pakistanis in Bin Laden Raid, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/worldlasia/l0intel.html
[https://perma.cc/2KL5XDKB] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
11.
ROSA BROOKS, How EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON 12, 112 (2016); see also GEN. JOHN P. ABIZAID
& ROSA BROOKS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON U.S. DRONE

POLICY 19 (2d ed. 2015).
12.
See O'Connell, supra note 3; Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Intensifying a Secret
Campaign
of
Yemen
Airstrikes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
8,
2011)
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09intel.html
[https://perma.cc/5DLT-M2RBI (archived Feb. 6, 2019); David Sanger & Eric Schmitt, As
Rift Deepens, Kerry Has a Warning for Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/politics/15diplo.html
[https://perma.cclHEL79NYR] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
13.
See, e.g., Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Address at Northwestern University School
of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opalspeechlattorney-general-eric-holderspeaks-northwestern-university-school-law [https://perma.cc/EAU3-U3QN
(archived
Feb. 6, 2019); Harold Koh, U.S. Dep't of State Legal Adviser, The Obama Administration
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But as the United States (among others) increasingly relied upon the
doctrine, the doctrine was also more frequently criticized as having
little grounding in law, and as having none of the actual substance
necessary to shape the decisions or in any way constrain the actions of
powerful target states. 1 4
In defense of the doctrine, efforts were made to provide it with a
more solid grounding in the jus ad bellum regime, and to infuse it with
substantive principles that would stipulate the conditions under which
target states could justifiably use force against NSAs in nonconsenting
territorial states. 1 5 This effort was led most famously by a former
British government official named Daniel Bethlehem, who in 2012
published a set of sixteen principles, now commonly referred to as the
"Bethlehem Principles," with the explicit goal of providing a more
sound legal foundation for the doctrine.1 6 Many governments and
policy makers, and indeed some scholars, quickly embraced the
doctrine so defined as representing the current state of customary
17
international law.
I applaud the spirit and purpose of Bethlehem's efforts, and I
acknowledge his admonition that scholars must better understand the
reality within which states are now operating and take seriously the
threats that they must address.' 8 But in this Article I argue that some
aspects of his principles remain dangerously inconsistent with parts of
the jus ad bellum regime and its relationship with other legal regimes,
and excessively privilege the interests of powerful target states at the
expense of the rights of weak territorial states. At the same time, in
the spirit of his project, I propose ways of refining the principles. Thus,
the Article explores how the doctrine, as articulated in the Bethlehem

and International Law: Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/
139119.htm [https://perma.cc/E7PN-SNV9] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
See generally, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Self-Defense Against Terrorists: The
14.
Meaning of Armed Attack, in THE LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (N. Schrijver & L. Van Den Herk eds., 2012);
Dawood I. Ahmed, Defending Weak States Against the "Unwillingor Unable"Doctrine of
Self-Defense, 9 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 1 (2013); Deeks Unwilling, supranote 7; Christian
J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 359 (2009); lona Ebben,
The Use of Force Against a Non-State Actor in the Territory of Another State: Applying
the Self-Defence Framework to Al-Qaeda (2011) (unpublished manuscript),
[https://perma.cclJZY9https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractlid=1960508
UWEJ] (archived Feb. 15, 2019).
See infra Part II.C for details of these developments.
15.
See generally Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against Imminent or Actual
16.
Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (2012) [hereinafter Bethlehem
Self-Defense Against NSAs]; Daniel Bethlehem, Principles of Self-Defense-A Brief
Response, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 579 (2013) [hereinafter Bethlehem A Brief Response].
See infra Part III.A.
17.
Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 773.
18.
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Principles, might be refined in ways that would pragmatically address
the threats posed by NSAs operating from within unwilling states,
while at the same time bringing the principles of the doctrine into
greater compliance with the jus ad bellum regime, and preserving the
integrity of the regime's relationships with IHL and the law of state
responsibility.
The unwilling or unable doctrine, and particularly one specific
policy maker's formulation of it, may at first glance seem a rather
esoteric topic of limited significance. But this is misleading. The
legitimacy and legality of this doctrine, which has come to be embodied
and articulated by the Bethlehem Principles, is of great importance to
the integrity of the jus ad bellum regime, and by extension, to the
future of international peace and security. For while the doctrine
cannot yet be understood as being part of customary international
law, 19 and aspects of it are inconsistent with long-established
principles of jus ad bellum, 20 if international law does evolve to
embrace the doctrine, the threshold for using force in self-defense
would be significantly lowered for all purposes and in all
circumstances, and the jus ad bellum regime would be destabilized and
weakened in a number of other ways, which will be explained below.
Thus, while the doctrine has been developed to more effectively deal
with the narrow and specific threat posed by transnational terrorist
organizations, it threatens to weaken the broader jus ad bellum regime
in ways that would increase the much more serious risk of interstate
armed conflict. And not only is that the primary risk that the jus ad
bellum regime was designed to address, but the risk of armed conflict
between major powers is already far graver today than it was a scant
decade ago. This is not to trivialize the threat posed by transnational
terrorism, but it poses a far lesser risk to states than the prospect of
interstate war. Therefore, this doctrine designed to address terrorism
cannot be allowed to undermine the legal regime developed to
constrain interstate use of force. As between the two, the integrity of
the jus ad bellum regime is far more important. And thus
understanding how the doctrine threatens to weaken thejus ad bellum
regime, and considering how to bring the doctrine back into compliance
with that regime, is important, particularly since refining the doctrine
can be done without significantly undermining its effectiveness.
Part II of the Article begins by identifying the positions it takes on
several contentious issues in jus ad bellum, in order to explain some of
the assumptions and premises of its argument. It also provides some
background on the history of the unwilling or unable doctrine, and then

19.
20.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.B-D.
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reviews the Bethlehem Principles themselves. In Part III, the Article
moves to critically examine those aspects of the Bethlehem Principles
that it challenges as being problematic. Specifically, it critiques how
the principles: (i) have been accepted as custom; (ii) distort and weaken
the concept of imminence; (iii) develop and rely upon a novel definition
of the concept of "armed attack"; (iv) conflate principles ofjus ad bellum
with those of IHL, and import considerations of the law of state
responsibility into the doctrine of self-defense; and (v) purport to confer
authority on the target state to unilaterally make a number of
important determinations-including the determination that the
territorial state is "unwilling" to either take action or consent to such
action-without unpacking and examining the differing nature of each
of those determinations, or providing differentiated standards to
govern how and by whom they are to be made.
In Part IV, the Article turns to the problem of trying to refine the
doctrine so as to better comply with the jus ad bellum regime, while
still retaining a framework that target states will not summarily
dismiss as being impractical or insufficient. This begins with a
rejection or reformulation of those aspects of the Bethlehem Principles
that are most egregiously inconsistent with established international
law-and which are not, in any event, central to the operation of the
doctrine-in order to restore the integrity of the jus ad bellum regime.
Then, drawing upon theories about self-judgment and evidentiary
standards in international law, the Article unpacks and identifies the
nature of each of the decisions that the target state is purportedly
permitted to make unilaterally under the doctrine, and explores the
kinds of standards that should govern how these decisions are made
and then later assessed. All of this aims to bring the doctrine into
greater compliance with the jus ad bellum regime, and redress the
serious asymmetry in how the doctrine balances the rights and
interests of target states and territorial states.

II. THE LAWS

OF WAR AND ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE

The unwilling or unable doctrine is claimed to be part of the
doctrine of self-defense in the jus ad bellum regime, though the use of
force against NSAs in nonconsenting states also implicates IHL. While
most readers will be familiar with the basic principles of the jus ad
bellum regime, there are important aspects of the doctrine of selfdefense that remain contested and controversial. 21 In this Part,

There is a massive literature on the topic, but some of the leading treatises
21.
include YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (6th ed. 2017)
[hereinafter DINSTEIN AGGRESSION]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE
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therefore, I identify what position I am taking on the contested issues
for the purposes of my arguments on the unwilling or unable doctrine.
In addition, I explain the salient aspects of the traditional
understanding of the relationship between jus ad bellum and IHL, 2 2
before going on to review the development of the unwilling or unable
doctrine and reprise the Bethlehem Principles. Those readers well
acquainted with these areas of the law may want to merely skim these
subparts.
A. Jus ad Bellum Regime Assumptions
The modern jus ad bellum regime was established with the UN
system after World War 11.23 The UN Charter (the Charter) prohibits
the threat or use of force against the political independence or
territorial integrity of other states, or in any other way inconsistent
with the principles enshrined in the Charter. 2 4 The Charter provides
for two general exceptions to this prohibition, being the Article 51 right
of individual and collective self-defense in response to an armed attack,
and the use of force by members of the United Nations as authorized
by the UN Security Council under Article 42 in order to restore or
maintain international peace and security. 2 5 The unwilling or unable
doctrine is argued to be part of the doctrine of self-defense reflected in
the Article 51 right. 26 To emphasize the obvious, the modern jus ad
bellum regime, developed in the wake of two catastrophic world wars,
reflected an effort to create a stronger system of constraints on the use
of force in order to reduce the incidence of armed conflict among states.

ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002); JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY,
PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (2004); CHRISTINE GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (4th ed. 2018); LUBELL, supra note 3;
LINDSEY MOIR, REAPPRAISING THE RESORT TO FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUS AD
BELLUMAND THE WAR ON TERROR (2010); RUYS, supra note 3.

22.
The brief overview provides what I take to be a relatively mainstream
perspective on the relevant principles, and I flag those aspects that are contested without
delving too deeply into the debates.
23.
For the history of these developments, see generally STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND
THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY (2005). For an argument that the Kellogg-

Briand Pact of 1928 (formally The General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy, 94 League of Nations Treaty Series No. 2137 (1928)), is
the real inflection point for the development of the modern jus ad bellum regime, see
generally OONA A. HATHEWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A
RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017).

24.
25.
cited note
26.

U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
Id. arts. 51, 30-43, respectively. For analysis of the regime, see supra sources
21.
See infra Part II.C & D.
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It is at the very center of the UN system, which is primarily for the
27
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. This broad
purpose should inform how we think about proposals to modify the
regime in order to deal with much narrower threats.
While the jus ad bellum regime in general is grounded in treaty,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that the principles of
the regime also exist independently in almost identical form in
customary international law. 28 While there is some debate as to
whether the scope of the right of self-defense is broader in custom than
it is under the Charter,2 9 here I will adhere to the well-established
view that the scope remains the same for both. 30 The language of
Article 51 of the Charter limits the right of self-defense to the use of
force in response to an "armed attack."3 1 This has given rise to two
distinct issues, both of which continue to be the subject of considerable
debate, and even some movement in terms of state practice, and both
of which are relevant to our inquiry: first, can states act in anticipation
of an armed attack, and if so, based on what standard; and second,
what use of force rises to the level of constituting an armed attack?
With respect to the first issue, some of the most careful and
persuasive scholarly studies of the issue suggest that the current state
of the law is that self-defense is only permitted in response to an actual
32
armed attack, and thus anticipatory self-defense is not permitted.
There is also, however, a strong body of scholarship, and some
movement developing in state practice, that reflects the contrary
view. 3 Since the unwilling or unable doctrine both assumes the

U.N. Charter, supra note 24, Preamble, art. 1.
27.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
28.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 172-82, 187-201 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua].
For discussion of and refutation of this argument, see IAN BROWNLIE, THE
29.
USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 269-78 (1963); Jan Brownlie, Legal Regulation of the Use of
Force, 8 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 717-20 (1959). For more recent analysis, see RUYS, supra
note 3, at 53-125.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at IT 187-202; RUYS, supra note 3, at 19 ("In
30.
sum, the idea that the adoption of the UN Charter gave rise to parallel existence of two
substantially divergent track for the international law on the use of force . . . is artificial
and theoretically unsustainable.").
U.N. Charter, supra note 24, art. 51.
31.
32.

DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 221-25; GRAY, supra note 21, at

169-74; RUYS, supra note 3, at 255-304.
See, e.g., John A. Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of
33.
Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary InternationalLaw, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 283,
315 (2003); The United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Security, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc.
A/59/565 (2004), ¶¶ 188-93 [hereinafter UN High-Level Panel on Threats]. See generally
W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, Centennial Essay: The Pastand Futureof the
Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (2006). On state practice, see
GRAY, supranote 21, at 169-75; RUYS, supra note 3, at 29-52. On the difference between
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legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense, and is most frequently invoked
in circumstances of anticipatory strikes, this Article assumes that a
narrow conception of anticipatory self-defense is valid. According to
this conception of anticipatory self-defense, states may use force in
anticipation of an "imminent armed attack." 34 What constitutes an
"imminent armed attack" is itself an issue of considerable debate, but
let us begin with the understanding that at its narrowest, it is an
attack that is already irrevocably in motion or on the verge of being
launched.3 5 As will be discussed below, this does not extend to more
temporally distant threats-self-defense cannot be claimed to justify
the use of force to prevent the development of potential future threats,
or to punish past attacks. 36 This is consistent with the understanding
that the exercise of self-defense is governed by the principle of
necessity, meaning that the use of force is a last resort and the only
means of preventing or terminating an armed attack. The principle of
necessity implies some degree of immediacy, for if the attack is not
currently in motion or immediately pending, there is likely time to
explore other alternatives to the use of force to prevent it.3 7 But there
is debate over the meaning and scope of the concept of imminence, to
which I will return below.
With respect to the second issue, namely what use of force rises to
the level of an "armed attack" for purposes of Article 51, the threshold
is quite high. The ICJ has held that the use of force constituting an
"armed attack" sufficient to trigger the right of self-defense is
substantially greater than the use of force that is itself subject to the
general prohibition.3 8 This of course means that not every unlawful use
of force rises to the level of armed attack triggering the right of selfdefense-which implies that the law contemplates circumstances in
which states are limited to non-forceful ways of responding to low

anticipatory and preemptive/preventative self-defense, see infra text accompanying note
142.
34.
FRANCK, supra note 21, at 97; RUYS, supra note 3, at 250-54.
35.
DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 232-33, 251-52. Dinstein also
argues that an attack irrevocably in motion may constitute an actual armed attack, even

if no shot has yet been fired, and also proposes an even more "immediate" category of
"interceptive self-defense." Id. at 228-32.
36.
See infra text accompanying note 120 (discussing preventative self-defense).
37.
GRAY, supra note 21, at 157-58; RUYS, supra note 3, at 250-54.
38.
The mining of a naval vessel, and the firing of a sea-sparrow missile at an
ocean-going oil-tanker, for instance, were held not to constitute armed attacks for the
purposes of triggering the right of self-defense. See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran
v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 160, IT 51, 64 (Nov. 6). See also Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶
191, 210-11, 230-32 (June 27).
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levels of unlawful uses of force. The United States does not share this
view, but it is among a small minority that takes this position.39 Here
I am assuming the established view that the threshold for armed
attack is high, but as we will explore below, just how high is a key issue
40
in the debate over the doctrine.
There are two other issues of some controversy regarding the
availability and operation of the doctrine of self-defense in response to
attacks launched by NSAs. The first relates to whether an attack
launched by an NSA qualifies as an "armed attack" triggering the right
of self-defense at all. There have been arguments that the jus ad
bellum regime only governs states, and thus does not contemplate an
attack by a non-state entity. 4 1 This issue has largely been settled after
9/11, when the UN Security Council quite clearly recognized that the
9/11 attacks constituted an "armed attack" justifying the right of selfdefense, 42 and it is assumed here that this is the current state of the
law. The second issue, however, relates to the lawful target of the use
of force undertaken in self-defense. The traditional view was that
Article 51 authorized the use of force against states to which the armed
attacks of NSAs could be attributed, but not against NSAs as suchmeaning not against the NSAs independent of the state in which they
are operating. In other words, it is the state to which the operations of
the NSA can be imputed or attributed that is the sole legal object of the
target state's use of force for purposes of the jus ad bellum regime.
Conversely, it is not lawful to use force against an NSA within the
territory of a state which is in no way responsible for the actions of the
NSA. 43 While this has been the traditional view, it is at the very heart
of the debate over the unwilling or unable doctrine, and is deeply
contested, as we will come to below. In short, some argue that the use
of force against an NSA within the territory of another state does not
constitute a use of force against the state, and thus does not implicate

RUYS, supra note 3, at 260; see also Michael Schmitt & Ryan Goodman, Best
39.
Advice for Policymakers on "Bloody Nose" Strike Against North Korea: It's Illegal, JUST
SECURITY (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/51320/advice-policymakersbloody-nose-strike-north-korea-illegall [https://perma.cc/E6Y7-WFPG] (archived Feb. 6,
2019).
See infra Part II.C.
40.
For analysis of both the issue and the debate, see DINSTEIN AGGRESSION,
41.
supra note 21, at 240-49; LUBELL, supra note 3, at 29-42; RUYS, supra note 3, 419-33.
S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
42.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at TT 227-30. The ICJ has also suggested that
43.
the U.N. Security Council resolutions referred to, see supra note 42, were not
inconsistent with nor changed the proposition that self-defense is only available when
the acts of an NSA can be attributed to a territorial state. See Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. Rep. 136, 1 139 (July 9).
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jus ad bellum at all. 44 This view is not widely accepted. But it also
ignores the fact that even if not a violation of the prohibition against
the use of force, the strike against the NSA is at minimum an unlawful
intervention and violation of the sovereignty of the territorial state,
and that self-defense is the only circumstance precluding wrongfulness
under the law of state responsibility that would justify these separate
violations. 45
B. Jus ad Bellum and IHL
While the jus ad bellum regime dictates the conditions for the use
of force or commencement of armed conflict between states, the jus in
bello regime, or IHL, governs the specific conduct of armed forces
within armed conflict. 46 IHL is based on two core ideas that coexist in
constant tension-namely, on the one hand that there must be legal
constraints placed on how armed forces fight, particularly on who and
what may be targeted, and on the other hand, the notion that there
must be legal authority for the use of deadly force by the legitimate
armed forces of a state in the pursuit of valid military objectives in
war. 47 We need not delve into even a cursory review of the main
principles, but it is important for the later analysis of the Bethlehem
Principles to note that IHL has very specific rules on targeting, which
are in turn based on the principle of distinction-one of the four core

44. See infra Part III.D. The more extreme contrary views suggest that neither
attribution of the acts of the NSA to the territorial state, nor the territorial state's
consent are required for a use of force against the NSA within the territorial state. See,
e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of
U.S. Use ofDrones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POLY 237, 249-50 (2010).
45. See generally Federica I. Paddeu, Self-Defence as a Circumstance Precluding
Wrongfulness, 30 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 93 (2017).
46.
Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the
Separationof the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 872, 965-66 (2008).
47.
On the IHL regime generally, see, for example, ANTHONY CULLEN, THE
CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (2010); CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLS. I & II (Jean-Marie

Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter HENCKAERTS, CUSTOMARY
IHL]; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2004) [hereinafter DINSTEIN CONDUCT]; THE
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013);
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, WITH COMMENTARY (2006) [hereinafter SANREMO
NIAC MANUAL]; LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (2002); GARY
D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR
(2010).
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48
principles of the IHL regime. Also, it is important to note that the
IHL regime only operates in the context of armed conflict, and the IHL
regime itself provides the criteria for determining the existence of an
armed conflict, whether international or non-international in
49
character.
What is key for our purposes is the relationship between the jus
ad bellum and IHL regimes. While related, governing different aspects
of war, they are in many important respects independent and distinct.
Specifically, this separation is crucial to the principle of equality in
IHL, which dictates that the rights and obligations under IHL apply
equally to the armed forces of all belligerents regardless of which side
ultimately has legal authority to use force under the rules of jus ad
bellum. This is considered essential to maximizing adherence to the
rules of IHL, and thus achieving the ultimate objective of reducing the
50
amount of human suffering in armed conflict. While the two regimes
are largely independent in this sense, there continues to be an
51
In particular, when a state uses
important connection between them.
of another state, in the
territory
the
or
within
armed force against
such that the rules
Charter,
UN
the
of
2(4)
sense captured by Article
armed attack it is
the
(or
force
of
use
that
then
of jus ad bellum apply,

See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
48.
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, arts. 44(3), 48 and
51(3), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 13(1), 8 June 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; DINSTEIN CONDUCT, supra note
47, at 27-28, 82-87; HENCKAERTS, CUSTOMARY IHL, supranote 47, at 3-36; SOLIS, supra
note 47, at 251-53.
49.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 2-3,
Aug. 12, 19496 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Additional Protocol I, supra note 48, arts.
1(3)-(4); Additional Protocol II, supranote 48, art. 1(1); see also Prosecutor v. Tidic, Case
No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, T 84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15,
1999). Considerable controversy surrounds these criteria, particularly in relation to US
claims about a transnational non-international armed conflict against certain NSAs, but
it does not bear directly on the unwilling or unable doctrine. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN,
NON-INTERNATIONAL

ARMED

CONFLICTS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

1-19

(2014)

[hereinafter DINSTEIN NIAC]. See generally Geoffery S. Corn & Eric T. Jensen,
TransnationalArmed Conflict: A 'Principled'Approach to the Regulation of CounterTerror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46 (2012).
DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 156-68; NEFF, supra note 23, at
50.
340-46, 366-69. See generally KEIICHIRO OKIMOTO, THE DISTINCTION AND RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN Jus AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO (2011); Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the

Divide between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in Warfare Against Non-State Actors, 34
YALE J. INT'L L. 541 (2009); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Overlap and Convergence: Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 157 (2007); Robert D. Sloane,
The Cost of Conflation: Preservingthe Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the
Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47 (2009).
But see Sloane, supra note 50, at 67-69 (suggesting that the independence of
51.
the regimes in the Charter era is actually exaggerated).
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responding to) constitutes the initiation of an international armed
conflict to which the rules of IHL will apply. 52 The use of force in jus
ad bellum terms triggers the operation of the lex specialis of IHL, which
then operates to govern the conduct of armed forces in the ensuing
hostilities-and it is thus IHL and not jus ad bellum that provides the
rules dictating the conditions under which persons and objects can be
lawfully targeted.5 3 Once the armed conflict is initiated, the jus ad
bellum principles of necessity and proportionality do continue to
operate, in that the defending state is limited to using force in selfdefense that continues to be necessary to prevent continued attacks,
and that is proportionate to the risk of harm posed by the armed
attacks to which the state is responding.5 4 But when a target state uses
force against an NSA within a territorial state, this does constitute the
use of force by one state against another.5 5 What is more, the operation
of IHL is also triggered, and thus both jus ad bellum and IHL will have
to be considered for the purposes of determining the legality of quite
different aspects of this action. 56 As I will return to below, it is
important not to conflate or confuse the distinct aspects that are
governed by each regime, or to apply principles from one regime to
aspects of armed conflict that are governed by the other regime.
C. Background and Origins of the Unwilling or Unable Doctrine
As explained at the outset, the Bethlehem Principles have come to
shape the debate on the unwilling or unable doctrine. Moreover, they
appear to have heavily influenced government positions, as evidenced
by the explicit reference to and endorsement of them in a number of

52.
DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 156-62 (also tracing how the
evolution of jus ad bellum led to arguments in favor of re-integration of the regimes);
DINSTEIN CONDUCT, supra note 47, at 14-16; MELZER, supra note 3, at 247-51, 394-95;
Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 188.
53.
See infra Part II.D.
54.
Terry D. Gill, When Does Self-Defence End?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 737 (Marc Weller ed., 2014); GRAY, supranote

21, at 157-65.
55.
See sources cited supra note 43. Some, of course, argue that a use of force
against NSAs within a territorial state does not constitute a use of force against the
state, or trigger an international armed conflict. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 44, at 24958.
56.
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
1996 I.C.J. 226, TT 75-87, 95 [hereinafter Threat of Nuclear Weapons]; GARDAM, supra
note 21, at xiii.
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important government statements. 5 They tend to be seen as
representing the current state of the law by a number of significant
58
members of the international community. The focus of my analysis,
therefore, will be on critiquing and trying to refine the doctrine as
articulated in the Bethlehem Principles. But before turning to the
detail of those principles, it may be helpful to explore some history of
the unwilling or unable doctrine in order to provide some context. For
while the doctrine has become far more prominent and controversial in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it does have an older pedigree.
Ashley Deeks explored the theoretical and historical foundations
for the doctrine in an important article that pre-dated the Bethlehem
Principles.5 9 There is a very long history to the more basic concept that
a state may lawfully take action against enemy forces operating from
within the territory of another non-belligerent state, if that state is
unwilling or unable to prevent those enemy forces from using its
territory in this way. The concept can be traced back to Emer de Vattel,
and was originally part of the law of neutrality, as later codified in the
60
1907 Hague Convention. Under the law of neutrality, neutral states
had an obligation to not permit belligerent forces to operate from
within their territory. 61 In the event that neutral states failed to
prevent such operations, other belligerents were permitted to use force
62
against those enemy forces within the neutral state's territory. In the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the principle was primarily
applied to states, in that the "enemy forces" that neutral states were
obliged to prevent from operating within their territory were typically
63
the armed forces of another belligerent state.
While the concept has its theoretical origins in neutrality law and
thus primarily implicates state action, the application of the principle
to non-state actors is not exclusively a late twentieth century

See, e.g., Right Honourable Jeremy Wright, QC MP and Attorney General of
57.
the United Kingdom, Address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Modern Law of Self-Defence (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/attorney-generals-speech-at-the-international-institute-for- strategic-studies
[https://perma.cc/837J-44HC] (archived Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Wright Self-defense];
George Brandis, QC Attorney General of Australia, The Right of Self-Defense Against
2017),
11,
(Apr.
Law
International
in
Attack
Armed
Imminent
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-right-of-self-defence-against-imminent-armed-attack-ininternational-law/#more- 15255 [https://perma.cclX8ER-L3VC] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
These include, most prominently, the United States, the United Kingdom,
58.
Australia, and Israel.
See generally Deeks Unwilling, supra note 7.
59.
Id. at 499.
60.
Id. at 497-503.
61.
Id. at 499-501.
62.
Paul Seger, The Law of Neutrality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
63.
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 248-272 (Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta
eds., 2014).
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phenomenon. As many have noted, the famous Caroline incident of
1837, which is typically cited as defining the test for anticipatory selfdefense, was an early example of the application of the unwilling or
unable doctrine to justify the use of force against non-state actors
within the territory of a nonconsenting state.6 4 It will be recalled that
the Caroline incident involved the use of force by Britain against nonstate actors, Canadian rebels and their American supporters,
operating within the territory of the United States. The insurgents had
seized an island within British-Canadian waters, from which they
were shelling Canada and threatening to launch an invasion of
Canadian territory. The British attacked, set fire to, and destroyed a
seventy-one-foot vessel that was being used by the Canadian
insurgents to transport weapons and personnel from within the United
States to the island. 65
This resulted in a diplomatic dispute between Britain and the
United States that spanned a number of years. It is this dispute that
produced the now famous statement-that the use of force had to be
justified by a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation"-that has come to
inform the test for self-defense. But the statement was made in an
exchange of diplomatic notes between U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster and Lord Ashburton, the representative of the United.
Kingdom in Washington for purposes of treaty negotiation, some five
years after the incident itself.66 A less well-known part of those notes

was the British assertion that the use of force was a justifiable exercise
of self-defense because the United States had been unwilling or unable
to prevent the Canadian rebels from conducting attacks against British
Canada. 6 7 Indeed, Ashburton began his argument by suggesting that
Webster's "ingenious" formulation of the principle was actually beside
the point and inapplicable to the case. 68 Ashburton suggested that the

64.
Deeks Unwilling, supra note 7, at 501-03; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, On
the Necessity of Pre-Emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 216-17 (2009).
65.
Dinstein points out that the CarolineIncident was not about self-defense in
the modern sense, since there was no prohibition on the use of force at the time-it was
really about constraints on measures short of war so as to avoid escalation. DINSTEIN
AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 225; GRAY, supra note 21, at 158. For a recent but sure
to be the seminal work on the factual and intellectual history of the Carolineincident,
see generally CRAIG FORCESE, DESTROYING THE CAROLINE (2018).

66.

Hunter Miller, British-AmericanDiplomacy The Caroline Case, in 4 TREATIES

AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 80-121 (1934). For

extensive analysis of the exchange and their legal significance, see FORCESE, supra note
65, Parts III-V.
67.
Miller, supra note 66.
68.
Id.
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case should be settled by consideration of the following question: "if
cannon are moving and setting up in a battery which can reach you
and are actually destroying life and property by their fire, if you have
remonstrated for some time without effect and see no prospect of relief,
when begins your right to defend yourself . . . ?"69 It is worth noting
that while Lord Ashburton was clearly suggesting that a state has a
right to use force in self-defense against individuals who are launching
attacks from within the territory of another sovereign, he also was
acknowledging that the right only arises after there has been
70
remonstration "for some time without effect and no prospect of relief."
While the doctrine thus has origins that long predate the 9/11
attacks, it gained much greater significance and prominence in the
militarized response to those attacks, and to transnational terrorism
more generally in the years that followed. The United States ramped
up its use of force against transnational terrorist organizations within
the territory of nonconsenting states, particularly in the form of
targeted killing with drones, and it explicitly articulated the unwilling
or unable doctrine as a justification for doing so. 71 This made the
doctrine far more prominent, and extended and applied the doctrine to
specifically justify action against NSAs. 72 As the legality of the
targeted killing program in particular became hotly debated, the
validity of the unwilling or unable doctrine also came under increasing
scrutiny.73 For while the doctrine may have been recognized within the
context of the law of neutrality, and there had been some instances of
states invoking it to justify strikes against NSAs within nonconsenting
states in the past, it was (and arguably continues to be) hotly disputed
whether the doctrine as applied to NSAs constitutes a principle of
customary international law that forms part of the broader doctrine of
self-defense. 74
The doctrine did receive further support in important fora even
prior to Bethlehem's article. For instance, in 2006 Chatham House
published a set of principles on the use of force, based on a survey of
noted academics and policy makers in the field, that asserted that
states may use force in self-defense against non-state actors operating
within the territory of nonconsenting states, if those states were

Id.
69.
Id.
70.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 13.
71.
See id.
72.
73.
Legality of Targeted Killing Program under InternationalLaw, LAWFARE,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/1egality-targeted-killing-program-under-international-law
(last visited Feb. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cclZQ4W-ZFEV] (archived Feb. 27, 2019). See
generally sources cited supra note 14.
See, e.g., Deeks Unwilling, supra note 7; sources cited supra note 14. See infra
74.
Part III.A.
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unwilling or unable to prevent the NSAs from mounting armed attacks
against the defending states. 75 In articulating this position, it
explicitly distinguished the ICJ decision in the Case ConcerningArmed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo, which had held that the
unwillingness or inability of a state to deal with a threat did not justify
a use of force against that state in self-defense, absent some evidence
that the territorial state supported and was involved in the activity of
the NSAs. 76 Similarly, in 2010 the principles emanating from a multiyear consultative process among academics and policy makers in
Europe were published, and submitted to both the foreign minister and
to the parliament of the Netherlands, under the title The Leiden Policy
Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law. 7
This set of principles also acknowledged that states could, in
exceptional circumstances, use force in self-defense against terrorist
organizations within the territory of another state without its consent,
in the event that the territorial state was "unwilling or unable to deal
with the terrorist attacks."7 8 And there has been an ever-growing body
of scholarship and articulation of policy positions that similarly adopt
and embrace the unwilling or unable doctrine.7 9
While the publication of such principles helped to bolster
arguments that the doctrine was (or was emerging as) part of the
customary international law doctrine of self-defense, they by no means
settled the debate. What is more, even those who supported the validity
of the doctrine acknowledged that it had never been developed in form
and substance beyond a basic principle that operated at a very high
level of generality and abstraction.8 0 Neither the Chatham House nor
the Leiden principles, for instance, provided any detailed criteria

75.
See generally Elizabeth Wilmhurst, Chatham House Principles of
InternationalLaw on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
963 (2006).
76.
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 1, TT 146-47 (Dec. 19).
77.
See generally Nico Schrijver & Larissa van den Herik, Leiden Policy
Recommendations on Counter-Terrorismand InternationalLaw, 57 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
531 (2010).
78.
Id. at 540, ¶ 32.
79.

See, e.g., DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21; LUBELL, supra note 3; Greg

Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of Military
Force, 4 U. CHI. J. INT'L L. 97 (2003). [Even to some extent the special rapporteur on
targeted killing.] See Alston Study, supranote 3; UN High-Level Panel on Threats, supra
note 33, at TT 188-95.
80.
Deeks Unwilling, supra note 7, at 503-06.
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governing the application of the doctrine. 81 On the basis of what
criteria is it determined that the NSA poses an imminent threat of
armed attack against the target state? Does the target state get to
make that determination unilaterally, or does the territorial state have
a say? On what criteria is it determined that the territorial state is
unwilling or unable to deal with the threat posed by the NSA? Must
the target state "remonstrate" with the territorial state, as suggested
by Lord Ashburton, before a determination of unwillingness is made?
And again, who gets to decide? What is more, there are separate
questions about the relationship of the doctrine with IHI-would the
use of force against the NSAs be part of, or give rise to, an international
armed conflict, triggering the operation of IHL? As Deeks explained in
her detailed exploration of the doctrine in 2012, up until that time the
82
doctrine provided answers to none of these questions. And so into this
void stepped Daniel Bethlehem, trying to put some more flesh on the
bones.
D. The Bethlehem Principles
Daniel Bethlehem explicitly wrote his article with a view to
addressing the perceived gap between the academic and the
83
operational perspectives on the use of force against NSAs. Having
served as the principal legal advisor of the United Kingdom's Foreign
84
and Commonwealth Office, he came from the policy world. In the
article, he wrote that the substance of the principles he was outlining
was drawn from discussions he was privy to within the foreign
ministry, the defense ministry, and among military legal advisors from
other countries.8 5 He argued that while the scholarly discourse on the
issue was important, the debate within and among governments about
what the appropriate principles are and should be was more
significant. 8 6 It is these debates, he argued, that were "material both
to the crystallization and development of customary international law
and to the interpretation of treaties."8 7 What is more, the academic

See generally, Wilmhurst, supra note 75; Schrijver & van den Herik, supra
81.
note 77.
Deeks Unwilling, supra note 7, at 503-06.
82.
Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 770. For initial
83.
commentary on the article, see also Ashley Deeks, Readings: Daniel Bethlehem on
Principles Governing Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors, LAWFARE (Jan. 10, 2015),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/readings-daniel-bethlehem-principles-governing-selfdefense-against-non-state-actors [https://perma.cclXAW4-HRHW] (archived June 14,
2019) [hereinafter Deeks Readings].
Deeks Readings, supra note 83.
84.
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debate, and particularly the arguments of scholars advocating for a
more restrictive approach to the law of self-defense, faced "significant
challenges" in shaping operational thinking, in part because the
doctrinal debate had "yet to produce a clear set of principles that
effectively address the specific operational circumstances faced by
states."8 8
Bethlehem also noted, however, that while the government-level
debates were more important than the scholarly discourse, they were
largely invisible
lements of them only became apparent through
infrequent statements or remarks by government officials, or as
evidenced by state practice. 89 Moreover, while important, the
government-level debates were no more successful than the scholarly
debates in developing clear, detailed principles to flesh out and govern
the operation of the doctrine. 9 0 He thus saw a need to "formulate
principles, capable of attracting a broad measure of agreement, that
apply, or ought to apply, to the use of force in self-defense against an
imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate actors."9 1 His article
proceeded to lay out sixteen such principles. Before getting to the
principles themselves, it is important to emphasize that Bethlehem
himself explicitly recognized that several of these principles did not
then represent either customary international law or treaty law.
Indeed, he acknowledged that several of them were likely to be
controversial, and he stated as his objective that they be merely the
basis for further debate, and potentially be the locus of future
consensus. 92 It is ironic that despite his cautionary qualifiers, several
governments have latched onto his principles as reflecting established
law. But it is also important to recognize that the Bethlehem Principles
have come to represent and embody the substance of the unwilling or
unable doctrine, for which reason any analysis of the doctrine
necessarily requires a focus on the Bethlehem Principles.
Turning to the principles themselves, it is worth noting at the
outset that some, such as the treatment of imminence and the nature
of armed attack, could be construed as being separate from the
unwilling or unable doctrine itself, which is explicitly addressed more
narrowly in only the last few of the Bethlehem Principles. I take the
view, however, that the Bethlehem Principles were intended to
constitute a single coherent formulation of the doctrine, and so should

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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be understood as such. 9 Also worth noting is that some of the
principles are not at all controversial, or at least may be taken as given
for the purposes of discussing the specifics of the doctrine. Thus,
Principles One through Three merely stipulate that states have a right
of self-defense against imminent or actual armed attack by NSAs; that
the use of force in self-defense should be a last resort; and that the use
of force in self-defense must be limited to what is necessary to address
the attack, and proportionate to the threat faced. 94 Principle Four,
however, is more novel, providing in part that: "the term 'armed attack'
includes both discrete attacks and a series of attacks that indicate a
95
concerted pattern of continuing armed activity." This contemplates
precisely the kinds of sporadic and relatively low-intensity attacks that
are frequently launched by transnational terrorist organizations.
Principle Five further supports the formulation in Principle Four, by
providing that a series of attacks may be considered as constituting a
concerted pattern of continuing armed activity where there is a
"reasonable and objective basis" for concluding that those perpetrating
the attacks (actual or imminent) are acting in concert. 96 In other
words, so long as the groups are determined to be working together,
the occasional attacks of al-Qaeda, along with the infrequent attacks
of AQAP, and those of Boko Haram, may be considered together as a
series of attacks constituting a concerted pattern of continuing armed
activity, which in the aggregate comprise an armed attack justifying
an exercise of the right of self-defense. Depending on how it is
interpreted, however, this definition of "armed attack" is not consistent
with the high threshold established by the International Court of
Justice in such cases as Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) 9 and Case
98
Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), about which I will
99
have more to say below.
Principles Six and Seven continue this focus on the idea of the
threat posed by individuals acting in concert but do so in a manner that
raises issues about the relationship between jus ad bellum and IHL.
Principle Six provides that those acting in concert include "those
planning, threatening, and perpetrating armed attacks and those

My thanks to Ashley Deeks for a helpful discussion on the different possible
93.
interpretations of the Principles.
Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775.
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U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, TT 191-95 (June 27).
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 160, ¶f 51, 64
98.
(Nov. 6); see also RUYS, supra note 3, at 7-11.
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providing material support essential to those attacks, such that they
can be said to be taking part in those attacks."1 00 Bethlehem explained
in a footnote that this is analogous to, but quite distinct from, the
concept of "taking direct part in hostilities" in IHL.' 0 Nevertheless,
Principle Seven provides that states may use force in self-defense
against those "actively planning, threatening, or perpetrating armed
attacks," as well as against "those in respect of whom there is a strong,
reasonable, and objective basis for concluding that they are taking a
direct part in those attacks through the provision of material support
essential to the attacks." 102 As I will return to below, the combination
of these two rules would seem to suggest that states may use force
against individuals determined to be providing material support for
armed attacks, independent and perhaps regardless of whether they
could be considered targetable under IHL. 0 3
Principle Eight relates to the highly controversial issue of what
constitutes an "imminent" armed attack. It provides five factors to
assist in this determination, which ultimately must be assessed by
reference to "all relevant circumstances." 104 The factors are (i) the
nature and immediacy of the threat; (ii) the probability of an attack;
(iii) whether the anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of
continuing armed activity; (iv) the likely scale of the attack and the
likely harm it will cause; and (v) the likelihood that there will be other
opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defense that will
cause less harm (particularly in the form of collateral damage).10 5 The
principle concludes with the assertion that "the absence of specific
evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of
an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is
imminent .

..

provided that there is a reasonable and objective basis

for concluding that an armed attack is imminent."1 0 6 The concept of
imminence has become highly controversial since 9/11, and as will be
discussed below, Bethlehem's test in Principle Eight does not begin to
resolve the problems.1 07
Principles Nine and Ten lay the foundation for the core of the
doctrine. Principle Nine provides that states have an obligation to take
all reasonable steps to ensure that their territory is not used by NSAs

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775.
Id. at 775 n.c.
Id. at 775.
See sources cited infra notes 195-202-and accompanying text.
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for purposes of mounting armed attacks on other states. Principle Ten
establishes a baseline presumption that states may not use force
against NSAs operating in the territory of another state without the
consent of that state, subject to certain exceptions and
qualifications. 108 It is the exceptions to this presumption that
constitute the core of the doctrine. Thus, Principle Eleven provides that
there is no requirement for consent in the event that there is a
"reasonable and objective basis" that the territorial state is colluding
with the NSA (thus referred to as a colluding state), or where it is
"otherwise unwilling to effectively restrain the armed activities" of the
NSA (thus referred to as a harboring state), leaving the victim state
with no other reasonably effective means of countering the imminent
or actual armed attack.' 0 9 So Principle Eleven covers the "unwilling"
aspect of the test, which relates to both "colluding" and merely
"harboring" states. 110 It should be noted that the "reasonable and
objective basis" test contemplated by Bethlehem is a higher standard
than the typical "reasonableness" test-he provided in a footnote that
it "requires that the conclusion is capable of being reliably supported
with a high degree of confidence on the basis of credible and all
reasonably available information.""'
Principle Twelve provides that consent is not required in the event
that there is a "reasonable and objective basis" for concluding that the
territorial state is "unable to effectively restrain the armed activities
of the nonstate actor," again leaving the target state with "no other
reasonably available effective means to address the imminent or actual
armed attack."11 2 Principle Twelve goes on to provide that in these
circumstances, the victim state is only exempted from the obligation to
obtain consent if there is also a "strong, reasonable, and objective basis
for concluding" that efforts to seek consent would undermine the
effectiveness of the exercise of self-defense, or would increase the risk
of armed attack. It also states that in the process of seeking consent,
the target state must provide the territorial state with a reasonable
plan of action, which if it refuses to take would then constitute
"unwillingness" and bring us back to Principle Eleven.113 This last
element, the refusal of consent, is important, because it is the criteria
for determining when an "unable" state is really an "unwilling" state,
and as I will discuss below, unwillingness should be the sole focus of
the doctrine-but of course, as discussed above, the target state can
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also infer this unwillingness. 114 The addition of the word "strong" to
the "reasonable and objective basis" here (and in Principle Seven, for
using force against those merely supporting an armed attack) is meant
to raise the standard because it is "the basis for taking action against
persons other than those planning, threatening or perpetrating an
armed attack."1 1 5
Principle Thirteen closes the loop by providing that the consent
given by the territorial state may be "strategic or operational, generic
or ad hoc, express or implied." 116 The governing consideration is
whether it is reasonable to regard the "representation or conduct" as
authoritative consent.'

17

While there is a presumption against the

inference of consent from historical acquiescence, the presumption can
be rebutted, and thus even past acquiescence may be the basis for
implied consent, particularly where such acquiescence has operated in
circumstances in which objection would have been reasonably
expected. 118 Little is said about who makes each of these
determinations, but it is implicit that the target state has the
discretion to make these decisions for itself. All of this of course lowers
the bar considerably on the determination of what constitutes consent,
and opens the door to controversy over whether consent has actually
been given in any particular situation-controversy that has
surrounded many US drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen." 9 Finally,
Principles Fourteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen merely provide that the
doctrine does not operate to the prejudice of the operation of the UN
Charter, the UN Security Council, or of customary international law
relating to the use of force or self-defense, or principles relating to the
law of state responsibility.12 0

114. On why the focus should be "unwillingness" and not "inability," see infra text
accompanying notes 224-226.
115. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775 n.d.
116. Id. at 777.
117. Bethlehem A Brief Response, supra note 16, at 585.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen
Airstrikes, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/
middleeast/09intel.html [https://perma.cc/E56G-RPUW] (archived Feb. 6, 2019); Sanger
& Schmitt, supra note 12.
120. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 777.
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE DOCTRINE

Before launching into a critique of the unwilling or unable
doctrine, it should be reiterated that there is much to be applauded in
Bethlehem's effort. He wrote that one of his primary objectives was to
move the policy
away from the rhetoric of a global war on terrorism, with its lack of geographic
and temporal and other limitations, hinged on status-based targeting and driven
by operational decision-making, and back to a legal framework that turns on an
appreciation of imminent threats, of sovereignty, of limitations rooted in
12 1
necessity and proportionality.

Such efforts to ensure that counterterrorism policy is properly
informed by international law in general and the jus ad bellum regime
in particular, and to thereby make the policy more likely compliant
with the law, is certainly to be welcomed. The problem is that some
aspects of the principles are not consistent with the established jus ad
bellum regime, or with the relationship between the jus ad bellum
regime and either IHL or the law of state responsibility. Moreover, they
do not fully achieve the other stated objective, which is to elaborate a
clear set of criteria for determining when any particular use of force
12 2
would be lawful.
A. The Myth of Custom
The first point that should be addressed is that there tends to be
a growing but arguably mistaken belief, reflected in both scholarship
and in government statements, that the unwilling or unable doctrine
12 3
Or, to put it in the
is now established customary international law.
most charitable terms, there has been a failure to distinguish between
the normative and the descriptive in arguments and statements
regarding the doctrine. This criticism does not extend to Bethlehem,
who was quite clear in both of his articles that he understood that
many of the principles would be controversial, and that he was making
normative arguments for their adoption rather than claiming they had
1 24
But the same cannot be said for
already crystallized as custom.

121. Bethlehem A Brief Response, supra note 16, at 580.
122. Ashley Deeks makes a similar point. See generally Deeks Readings, supra
note 83.
123. But cf. Olivier Corten, The 'Unwilling or Unable' Test: Has it Been, and Could
it Be, Accepted?, 29 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 779 (2016) (arguing that while certain states, such
as the U.S. and the U.K., seem to believe that the unwilling or unable doctrine is now
customary international law, this is not truly the case).
124. Bethlehem A Brief Response, supra note 16, at 580-81; Bethlehem SelfDefense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 773.
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many others writing in the field, and perhaps more importantly,
government officials making formal statements on their governments'
official policies.1 25 For instance, Jeremy Wright, attorney general of
the United Kingdom, in a speech in early 2017, suggested that the law
had changed as a result of the 9/11 attacks, and went on to say that
a number of states have also confirmed their view that self-defence is available
as a legal basis where the state from whose territory the actual or imminent
attack emanates is unable or unwilling to prevent the attack or is not in an
effective control of the relevant part of its territory. 1 2 6

While parts of his speech reflected an acknowledgment that not all
states agreed with the British position, and that parts of his claims on
imminence were normative, the implication seemed to be that the
unwilling or unable doctrine was fast becoming custom if it had not
already crystallized as such.' 2 7 Most recently, representatives of the
United Kingdom and Australia, speaking at the American Society of
International Law Annual Meeting in Washington, DC, suggested that
the Bethlehem Principles were custom.

128

Turning to the actual evidence, according to one review of state
positions on the issue, which Jeremy Wright himself referenced, only
ten countries have explicitly endorsed the unwilling or unable doctrine
as a justification for their own use of force in the UN era.1 29 Several of
these examples, such as that of Canada, Australia, the Netherlands,
and Germany, were primarily drawn from letters to the UN Security
Council in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter to explain their
support for operations against ISIS in Syria and Iraq as being part of
collective self-defense actions. 3 0 Another twelve states were listed as

125. For a compilation of government positions, see Chachko & Deeks, supra note
6. For examples of full statements by government representatives, see, for example,
Brandis, supra note 57; Wright Self-defense, supranote 57.
126. Wright Self-defense, supra note 57.
127. Id.
128. The ASIL Proceedings for 2018 are not yet available, but for an analysis of
the panel, see Alex Moorehead, Brazil's Spirited Defense of the Legal Prohibitionon the
Use
of Force and Self Defense,
JUST SECURITY
(Apr.
20,
2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/55126fbrazils-robust-defense-legal-prohibition-force/
[https://perma.cc/8G7T-NHWJ] (archived Feb. 6, 2019); asill906, Use of Force against
Non-State Actors, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=fi66g4Jg0pA [https://perma.cc/2W5M-9KXY] (archived Feb. 15, 2019).
129. Deeks Unwilling supra note 7, at 549-50; see also Chachko & Deeks, supra
note 6.
130. Chachko & Deeks, supra note 6. For further discussion of state practice in
relation to Syria, see Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J. Toope, Self-Defence against Non-State
Actors: Are Powerful States Willing but Unable to Change InternationalLaw?, 67 INT'L
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either having provided implicit endorsement (three countries) or being
ambiguous cases (nine states), while four were found to have explicitly
objected.1 3 1 Ashley Deeks' earlier and more exhaustive study includes
an appendix of all cases of the use of force against either an NSA or the
armed forces of a third country, within the territory of a nonconsenting
state-so a sample that goes beyond only uses of force against NSAsbetween the years 1817 and 2011 (so prior to the more recent rash of
32
cases involving air strikes against ISIS in Syria and Iraq).1 She found
only thirty-nine cases. Of these, a full twenty-two were undertaken by
the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, or Israel.' 3 3 Thus,
those who assert these claims of custom tend to overly privilege and
weight the practice of a handful of Western First-World states, and to
either ignore or discount the inconsistent practice and explicit
objections emanating from the Global South. Alonso Gurmendi has
recently detailed the many ways in which the countries of Latin
America have repudiated the concept, in both practice and official
government statements.1 34 In sum, the evidence does not reflect the
kind of widespread state practice and opinio juris that is typically
required to corroborate claims regarding the establishment of new
35
principles of customary international law.
In addition to this dearth of evidence to support the claims for
custom, the positions taken also arguably give far too little significance
to the decisions of the ICJ, which actually stand as evidence against
the proposition that this doctrine is custom. As will be discussed below,
the ICJ has held that the use of force against NSAs in nonconsenting

& COMP. L.Q. 263, 276-77 (2018); Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State
Actors: The State of Play, 91 INT'L L. STUD. 1, 20-30 (2015).
131. Chachko & Deeks, supra note 6.
132. See generally Deeks Unwilling supra note 7.
133. Id. at 501-03, 549-50.
134. Alonso Gurmendi, Leticia & Pancho: The Alleged Historic Precedents for
Unwilling or Unable in Latin America, Explored (PartI, Leticia), OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 7,
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(Oct. 22, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/17/state-practice-regarding-self-defence[https://perma.cc/AQ6F-STVN]
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JUST SECURITY (May 16, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/56316/1atin-american-viewjus-ad-bellum/ [https://perma.cc/7NEE-49B5] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
135. See, e.g., RUYS, supra note 3, at 236; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
60-62 (8th ed. 2017); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 162-67
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the custom is formed by "specially affected states"-such arguments ignore both the
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states in response to armed attacks is only justified if the acts of the
NSA can be attributed to the territorial state. 136 Daniel Bethlehem
mentions several of the decisions that are inconsistent with aspects of
his principles, but he then casts doubt on their authority,1 3 7 as do the
Chatham House Principles.1 38 But the judgments of the ICJ cannot be
so easily discounted, particularly when making arguments about what
the current state of the law is, and in the absence of convincing
contrary evidence. And even when making normative arguments, it is
dangerous to the international rule of law to cavalierly dismiss and
disregard the judgments of the ICJ.
B. The Perversionof Imminence
The second problem posed by the doctrine relates to the concept of
imminence. There has been considerable controversy over the concept
of imminence as it relates to the doctrine of self-defense more
broadly.1 39 As noted above, "anticipatory self-defense" is the use of
force in response to an "imminent armed attack," which many consider
to be a lawful exercise of the right of self-defense. 14 0 And as noted
above, imminent has been traditionally understood to mean "about to
occur," or an attack "irrevocably in motion,"1 4 1 and is a concept integral
to the principle of necessity. In the run up to the invasion of Iraq in
2003, there was great debate over whether "preventative self-defense"
also legitimately came within the scope of the doctrine of selfdefense1 4 2 (the debate is all the more confused because different people
use the term "pre-emptive" self-defense as synonymous with
"preventative," while other people use "pre-emptive" to mean

136.
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AMERICA 13-15 (2002). For analysis of the debate, see, for example, DINSTEIN
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"anticipatory"). 1 43 Preventative self-defense, also famously referred to
as the "Bush Doctrine," is the use of force in response to a growing
potential for an armed attack in the future, or even a developing but
still distant threat that cannot yet be classified as a threat of armed
attack.1 44 This required a reformulation of imminence as an essential
aspect of self-defense, with arguments that the magnitude of the harm
that will result if the threat materializes allows for an elongation of the
45
concept of imminence, notwithstanding the lack of immediacy.1 As
Condoleezza Rice pithily captured the idea, and George W. Bush
famously repeated, states cannot wait for a smoking gun in the form of
a mushroom cloud before acting in self-defense against the threat
posed by weapons of mass destruction. 146 But the concept of
preventative self-defense enshrined in the Bush Doctrine was widely
rejected after the Iraq War of 2003.147
Notwithstanding the condemnation of the concept of preventative
self-defense, however, the ideas about imminence that were at its core
have bled into the thinking about the rationales for targeted killing
and the unwilling or unable doctrine.1 48 For instance, we see the same
kinds of arguments for the elongation, or even complete elimination, of
the temporal relationship between the preparation for an armed attack
and its execution. This thinking was reflected most clearly in the
American government arguments developed to justify the killing of
Anwar al-Awlaki, the American imam who was a propagandist for
AQAP. These arguments were laid out in a Department of Justice
white paper,1 49 which was based on a later-disclosed Office of Legal
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Counsel (OLC) memo.15 0 The killing was justified (in part) on the
grounds that it was a legitimate use of force in self-defense against an
imminent armed attack, 5 1 but the white paper articulated a theory of
imminence that virtually eliminated all temporal meaning from the
concept:
[T]he condition that an operational leader present an "imminent" threat of
violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to
have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take
place in the immediate future . . . . this definition of imminence, which would
require the United States to refrain from action until preparations for an attack
are concluded, would not allow the United States sufficient time to defend itself
. ... The United States is likely to have only a limited window of opportunity
within which to defend Americans in a manner that has both a high likelihood
of success and sufficiently reduces the probabilities of civilian casualties ....
Delaying action against individuals continually planning to kill Americans until
some theoretical end state of the planning for a particular plot would create an
unacceptably high risk that the action would fail and that American casualties
would result. 15 2

Given that imminence is at root a temporal concept, this definition
arguably hollowed out its essence and rendered it meaningless. The
white paper further argued, "the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its
associated forces demands a broader concept of imminence in judging
when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an
imminent threat, making use of force appropriate." 5 3 The argument
was that once a group had plotted attacks against the United States in
the past, it could be assumed that they were continuing to do so in the
present, and the United States was entitled to use any window of
opportunity to respond to the likelihood of such attacks in the future.1 54
As it happens, Anwar al-Awlaki was killed more than a year after he
was placed on a kill list, long after an application for an order to stop
the killing brought by his father was dismissed by a federal court (in
part on grounds that his father lacked standing, because al-Awlaki
himself could have himself brought the claim, and because there had
not yet been a violation of the law of nations),15 5 and after several

Associated Force, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/us-lethal-operations-against-alqaida-leaders#toc-document-a-department-of-justice-white-paper-on-lethal-operationsagainst-al-qa-ida-leaders (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4RNJ-HHLA]
(archived Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter DoJ White Paper].
150. OLC AL-AULAQI MEMO, supra note 148.
151. DoJ White Paper, supra note 149, at 1.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 7-8; see also OLC Memo on Al-Aulaki, supra note 148.
155. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2010).
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missed attempts. 156 The government never suggested in its
explanations of the strike that he had been in the midst of launching
1 57
any specific attack when he was killed.
The Bethlehem Principles would appear to embrace this idea that
imminence can somehow mean something other than "about to occur,"
"close at hand," or "impending"-in other words, can have a meaning
that is divorced from the temporal component that is the very essence
15 8
I say
of the normal understanding of the concept of imminence.
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Principle
recalled, is "the nature and immediacy of the threat," which would
suggest an understanding of imminence in traditional temporal
terms. 159 But the other elements militate against this. Before
examining these in turn, it is helpful to note that the final concluding
assertion in Principle Eight echoes the Department of Justice white
paper in asserting that the lack of specific evidence as to where an
attack will take place, or the precise nature of the attack, does not
16 0
It is difficult to
preclude the conclusion that an attack is imminent.
is virtually
attack
an
that
establish
to
possible
be
could
it
how
imagine
the use
that
and
pending,
or
immediately
certain, and either in motion
without
it,
prevent
to
option
available
only
of force is therefore the
knowing the nature or location of the attack. The third element of
Principle Eight raises similar issues-it asks whether the anticipated
61
attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity.1

156. Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant ina Car in Yemen,
N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/
anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.htm [https://perma.cc/VLR7-8CTE] (archived Feb.
6, 2019). Also killed were Samir Khan, an American American-Pakistani dual national
who published an English Language on-line magazine called "Inspire" for al-Qaeda. For
more detailed examination of the campaign to kill Al-Awlaki, see MARK MAZZETTI, THE
WAY OF THE KNIFE: THE CIA, A SECRET ARMY, AND A WAR AT THE ENDS OF THE EARTH
(2013) [hereinafter MAZZETTI KNIFE]; JEREMY SCAHILL, DIRTY WARS: THE WAR IS A
BATTLEFIELD (2013).

157. SCAHILL, supra note 156; Conor Friedersdorf, How Team Obama Justifies the
2012),
(Oct.
24,
16-Year-Old American, THE ATLANTIC
Killing of a
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/how-team-obama-justifies-thekilling-of-a- 16-year-old-american/264028/ [https://perma.cc/JT64-YUJ8] (archived Feb.
6, 2019).
158. It is instructive to consider how American courts have interpreted the concept
of imminence as part of the doctrine of self-defense in domestic criminal law. See, e.g.,
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (Sup. Ct. N.C. 1989) ("[T]he term 'imminent,' . .. has
been defined as 'immediate danger, such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be
guarded against by calling the assistance of others or the protection of the law.' Or cases
have sometimes used the phrase 'about to suffer' interchangeably with 'imminent' to
describe the immediacy of threat that is required to justify killing in self-defense.").
159. See supra Part II.D. See supra text accompanying note 105.
160. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775-76.
161. Id.
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Given that the principles define "armed attack" as including an
accumulation of small strikes, this element of Principle Eight could be
taken to mean that when the next sporadic terrorist strike in a series
or pattern of such strikes is deemed to breach the threshold in making
all of them together an armed attack for purposes of justifying selfdefense (an issue to be analyzed below), then this next strike need not
be already in motion or immediately pending in order for it to be
"imminent." 16 2 In other words, such a potential future strike may be
classified as "imminent" based on the nontemporal consideration of
whether it is determined to be part of a pattern of strikes that
cumulatively constitute an armed attack, and force may be used in selfdefense in response to that future strike, no matter how distant in time
it may be.
The second and fourth of the five elements of Principle Eight most
clearly reflect the essential logic of the Bush Doctrine, in that they
require an assessment of the probability of an attack, as well as the
likely scale of the attack and the likely harm it will cause.16 3 It is quite
true that a standard formula for measuring the risk associated with an
event is to assess the probability of that event occurring, multiplied by
the magnitude of the harm it would cause. 164 This formula is not,
however, a proper measure of imminence. Risk and imminence are
entirely different concepts. The product of probability and harm has
nothing to do with the timing of a risk materializing, or the time
available to find ways to avoid the harm. 165 Risk as measured in this
way is no doubt a vitally important policy consideration in trying to
develop responses to the threats of both weapons of mass destruction
and transnational terrorist attacks. But it is improper to smuggle the
notion of risk into the concept of imminence for the purposes of

162.
163.

See infra Parts III.C, IV.A.
Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supranote 16, at 775.

164.

See, e.g., MARVIN RAUSAND,

RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY, METHODS, AND

APPLICATIONS 1-28 (2013). Tort aficionados will also note that this is inherent in the
Learned Hand test, which is essentially a question of whether the burden of avoiding the
risk is greater than the risk itself. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d. 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947).
165. Akande and Lieflander, in an article critical of the Bethlehem Principles, do
however accept that these factors do serve as two of the essential elements of imminence,
and even that where a threat is sufficiently probable and severe, "the mere fact that it is
still temporally remote should provide no injunction against action where that action is
necessary and proportionate." But the last clause of course begs the question, since
imminence is an element of necessity; and in any event, even they do not eliminate the

temporal element, but develop something closer to the "last clear chance" concept that I
consider below. Dapo Akande & Thomas Lieflander, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence,
and Proportionalityin the Law of Self-Defense, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 565 (2013).
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lowering the legal threshold for the use of force in self-defense. The
occurrence of some event can be both quite probable and very likely to
cause massive harm, and yet still be far in the future, thus providing
lots of time to pursue various alternatives for avoiding or eliminating
the risk.1 6 6 Crucially, for the purposes of the doctrine of self-defense,

this formulation of probability and magnitude of harm does not make
a use of force in response necessary. The very fact that we have time
before the risk is likely to materialize means that we at least have an
obligation to search for alternatives to the use of force as a means of
preventing the attack, including ways to change the conditions and
circumstances that make the event probable in the first place. This
search for alternatives brings us to the last factor, and perhaps the
most interesting and complex aspect of the problem of imminence.
The fifth factor in Principle Eight is the likelihood that "there will
be other opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defense that
may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or
damage." 167 There are two problems with this that need to be
untangled and addressed separately. The first is that by including
considerations of collateral damage, it not only introduces elements
that have nothing to do with the immediacy of the attack, but once
again conflates concepts from IHL into a jus ad bellum analysis. These
considerations of collateral harm are of course absolutely necessary for
the analysis of whether the available options for a use of force in selfdefense would be lawful in IHL terms in any given context, but they
have no bearing on the imminence of the attack being responded to. If
the IHL analysis indicated that waiting to respond might increase the
probability of collateral damage, even to the point of making the
planned operations unlawful, that would not make the attack any more
imminent so as to justify an earlier response. The second problem is
raised by the "other opportunities" notion.1 68 On this view, imminence
is separated from its temporal roots in a slightly different manner.
Rather than using imminence as meaning that the attack is about to
occur, as the common notion of the concept would suggest, it is used to
mean that the window of opportunity for preventing the attack is about
to close. The attorney general of Australia in a recent speech clearly
articulated this "last feasible window of opportunity" conception of
imminence, and several commentators responding to his remarks

166. The ICJ itself has, in the context of necessity in the law of state responsibility,
itself addressed the relationship between risk and imminence. See GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 42 (Sept. 25).
("'[I]mminence' is synonymous with 'immediacy' or 'proximity"', and while the word peril
"certainly evokes the idea of 'risk'," the peril "must have been a threat to the interest at
the actual time.").
167. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775-76.
168. Id.

2019]

UNWILLING OR UNABLE DOCTRINE

421

noted that this actually blurs or indeed collapses the distinction
between "anticipatory" and "preventative" self-defense, effectively
embracing the Bush Doctrine. 16 9
This criticism of the "last window of opportunity" test is partly
right, but it does not quite capture the entire problem, nor does it fully
address the valid intuition that underlies this attempt to reformulate
the concept of imminence. This reflects what I think is a broader
problem with the imminence debate, which is that both sides have
tended to lose sight of the fact that imminence is a crucial element of
the principle of necessity-and that its meaning and significance
always have to be assessed and understood in the context of the role it
plays in establishing the necessity of a use of force. Necessity is the
core principle of the doctrine of self-defense, meaning that a use of force
in response to an armed attack must be a last resort, the only
alternative, to preventing the attack-and imminence only matters for
purposes of establishing that necessity. To refer back to the Caroline
incident, the "no moment for deliberation" was inextricably tied to the
"no choice of means" as factors explaining necessity. 170 Imminence and
immediacy are simply factors for establishing that there are no
alternatives to the use of force available as a means of responding to
and preventing the anticipated or ongoing armed attack. If the
anticipated attack is not imminent, in the traditional sense of being in
the immediate future, then typically-though not always-there is
time to explore other options that will be still available, and the use of
force would not truly be a "last resort." When, for instance, former
Prime Minister Menachem Begin conceded, in a speech at Israel's
National Defense College in 1982, that on the eve of Israel's preemptive strikes that commenced the 1967 war, Israel had "had
choices," he was essentially admitting that the Israeli use of force had
not been a necessary last resort to prevent an imminent Egyptian
attack. 171
The valid intuition of the "last window of opportunity"
formulation, however, is that there may be situations in which there

169. Brandis, supra note 57; see, e.g., Adil Haque, Imminence and Self-Defense
Against Non-State Actors: Australia Weighs In, JUST SECURITY (May 30, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/41500/imminence-self-defense-non-state-actors-australiaweighs/ [https://perma.cc/J8UD-L779] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
171. RICHARD HAAS, WAR OF NECESSITY WAR OF CHOICE 9-10, 299 (2009). But see

DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 211-12 ('That [an Egyptian armed attack was
at an early stage], at least, was the widely shared perception ... in June 1967, based on
sound judgment of events. Hindsight knowledge, suggesting that .. . the situation may
have been less desperate than it appeared, is immaterial.").
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are actually no alternatives remaining, and the necessity of response
is thus immediate, even if the attack itself is not imminent in the
traditional sense.1 72 A thought experiment may help illustrate this:
suppose we learn somehow that an invading force of a more advanced
alien life form is on its way to Earth, and that it will arrive in ten years.
Ten years is not immediate or imminent in the traditional sense. But
what if we also learn that it will take us close to ten years to develop
an adequate defense to the invading force? Then, all of a sudden, the
necessity of response takes on the character of "instant, overwhelming,
1 73
To
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as
such
threat
a
characterize
to
hesitate is to be doomed. It is possible
materialize
will
itself
harm
the
that
this as imminent, not in the sense
in the immediate future, but in the sense that a particular response is
immediately necessary, in that there are no alternative options, and if
174
the response is not immediate it will be too late and thus ineffective.
Climate change is a real example of this form of imminent threat, in
that the materialization of the risk of harm is not immediately at hand
(though in 2019 that assertion is increasingly questionable), but if an
immediate response is not undertaken it will be impossible to prevent
5
the materialization of catastrophic harm in the future.17
It is important to note, however, that in the context of the doctrine
of self-defense, even this conception of imminence-let us call it the
true "last clear chance" formulation-continues to be an essentially
temporal concept and continues to operate primarily as a factor for
establishing necessity. In essence, it continues to be about the time
remaining within which alternatives to the use of force can be explored
before a use of force is the only remaining means of preventing or
responding to an attack. It is this form of imminence that the "last
window of opportunity" test is imperfectly grasping for.
I say that the unwilling or unable doctrine formulation is
imperfect, and different from this 'last clear chance" formulation, for
two reasons. First, as a practical matter, in the context of action
against NSAs in nonconsenting states, the target state is virtually
never going to have sufficiently compelling evidence that: (i) an armed
attack in the future is certain (a conclusion that requires compelling
evidence of both-capability and a decision reflecting specific intent); (ii)
the current window of opportunity to use force is truly the last and only

172. This is explored as well by Akande & Lieflander, supra note 165, at 565.
173. Miller, supranote 66.
174. This thought experiment comes from Eliezer Yudkowsky, who used it in a
podcast to explain how and why the threat posed by artificial general intelligence can be
viewed as being imminent. Al: Racing Toward the Brink: A Conversation with Eliezer
Yudkowsky, SAM HARRIS (Feb. 6, 2018), https://samharris.org/podcasts/116-ai-racingtoward-brink/ [https://perma.cc/3RMX-Y3HU] (archived Feb. 27, 2019).
175.

See generally, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON

CLIMATE

CHANGE,

GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.51C (2018), https://report.ipcc.ch/srl5/pdf/srl5-spm-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3R8P-QWBL] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
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chance to prevent the threat from materializing; and, therefore, (iii)
there are no other alternatives remaining to prevent the attack, and
thus the immediate use of force is necessary. And all three of these
elements must arguably be satisfied to establish the true "last clear
chance" element of imminence and thus necessity. But in the context
of the unwilling or unable doctrine, it is far more likely that the target
state will have established that there is "a chance" to target members
of the NSA, and that it will have little way of knowing that it is "the
last chance" to use force to prevent the future attack, or that there will
be no other alternatives to the use of force in the time available to
explore them. 176
This is compounded by the second reason that the doctrine's
window of opportunity element is different from the "last clear chance"
formulation, which is that it is coupled with elements that effectively
strip "imminence" of its essential temporal meaning. Because, while
formulated as something like a "last clear chance" conception of
imminence, it really just confuses an attractive current or imminent
window of opportunity to strike the NSA with the idea that an
immediate response is the only way to prevent a certain specific armed
attack. What is missing is any requirement to establish that there is a
true necessity to act immediately, that there are no alternatives
available-including, importantly, through consultation and possible
collaboration with the territorial state. This conception of imminence
tends to smuggle in aspects of the Bush Doctrine, 177 and if it is
legitimated and entrenched in the approach to the use of force against
nonconsenting states harboring NSAs, it may in turn influence
thinking about imminence in other jus ad bellum contexts.
C. Incoherence on Armed Attack
Closely related to the problems with the conception of imminence
is an apparent incoherence in how the principles characterize and rely
upon the concept of "armed attack." The problem is twofold. First, the
manner in which the principles define armed attack is a significant

176. See generally, e.g., Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond
Borders, 2 HARV. NAT. SEC. J. 283 (2011) [hereinafter Alston CIA] (in the context of
targeted killing); Haque, supra note 169 (on these evidentiary difficulties). In this sense,
the 'last clear chance" test shares some features of the "ticking time bomb" hypothetical
in the torture debate, which depends on premises that require a level of knowledge that
in practical terms is virtually impossible to establish or verify-and thus, while
providing a veneer of principled theoretical justification, the hypothetical is highly
misleading as any kind of guide to policymaking.
177. See Haque, supra note 169; supra text accompanying note 147-154.
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17 8
departure from the established understanding in international law.
Second, even if we were to accept the definition embraced by the
Bethlehem Principles, that definition cannot be coherently reconciled
with other parts of the argument that target states make, and which
the Bethlehem Principles implicitly support, to justify uses of force
against nonconsenting states.
Beginning with the problem of characterization, it will be recalled
that Principle Four of the Bethlehem Principles defines "armed attack"
as including "both discrete attacks and a series of attacks that indicate
179
It notes that the
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attacks may be
of
a
series
and
attacks
discrete
distinction between
in self-defense.
respond
to
necessity
the
of
relevant to considerations
for assessing
elements
five
the
of
element
Similarly, the third
whether the
of
consideration
for
calls
imminence in Principle Eight
armed
of
continuing
pattern
concerted
anticipated attack is part of a
18 0
the
view
embrace
principles
the
All of this suggests that
activity.
"armed
an
constitute
aggregate
the
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may
that a series of strikes
attack" even though no one of the strikes on its own would satisfy the
test. The United States, of course, does not accept that there is a
material gap between a use of force that would violate Article 2(4) of
the Charter, and an armed attack for purposes of Article 51 of the
Charter.1 8 1 But the US view is an outlier. 182 The ICJ has made clear
83
that there is a sizeable gap between the two.1 Moreover, in the Oil
Platforms case, it clearly established that the threshold for
establishing an armed attack is quite high, with neither a mine strike
on a naval vessel nor a missile strike on an oil tanker, both of which
were part of a pattern of attacks, satisfying the test. 184 A careful
analysis of state practice and opinio juris suggests that the vast
majority of the international community subscribes to the more
traditional ICJ view. 185 And while there is some academic support for
the idea that "an accumulation of events" may in the aggregate
constitute an armed attack, it is arguably a minority view that is not

178. The seminal work on armed attack is RUYS, supra note 3.
179. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775.
180. Id.
181. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 39; see also William H. Taft, Self-Defense and
the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 295, 300-02 (2004) (views of the thenlegal counsel to the State Department).
182. GRAY, supra note 21, at 153-57; RUYS, supra note 3, at 143-57. But see
DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 209-11.

183. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, TN 189-91 (June 27).
184. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 160, TT 51, 64,
161-219 (Nov. 6). For a critique of this decision, see Taft, supra note 181.
185. RUYS, supranote 3, 143-74.
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yet reflected in established law. 186 Thus, the Bethlehem Principles
incorporate a conception of armed attack that is inconsistent with
established law. Moreover, they do not provide any guidance
whatsoever as to the standards that might apply in determining when
a series of attacks by disparate but purportedly associated groups
satisfies this test of "concerted pattern of continuing armed activity"
sufficient to constitute an armed attack. It is worth noting that similar
issues arise in trying to determine whether conduct that is alleged to
constitute crimes against humanity is sufficiently "widespread" or
"systemic" to satisfy the definition, and a growing body of
jurisprudence and scholarship has grappled with developing the
contours of the concept. 187
Target states and the Bethlehem Principles are advancing a lower
threshold for armed attack precisely because the risk posed by
transnational terrorist organizations is characterized by exactly this
pattern of sporadic, repeated, lower-intensity attacks. These are
attacks against civilian targets, often months apart, in disparate
locations, and often on the scale of car bombs, efforts to bring down a
single plane, or vehicular attacks against pedestrians.1 8 8 Attacks are
launched by different groups that have ill-defined affiliations with one
another. Attacks on the scale of 9/11, which certainly cross the
threshold for an armed attack, are more the exception rather than the
rule. I do not want to be misunderstood as suggesting that NSAs
cannot be responsible for armed attacks as a matter of law, 18 9 but
rather that the low-intensity and sporadic attacks often mounted by
terrorist organizations do not, individually or in the aggregate, rise to
the level of an armed attack as that term has been traditionally
understood in jus ad bellum.190 What is more, even if we were to accept

186. For some support for the "accumulation" argument, see, for example,
DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 209-11. Contra GRAY, supra note 21, at 15357; RUYS, supra note 3, at 168.
187. See, e.g., Christopher Roberts, On the Definition of Crimes Against Humanity
and Other Widespread or Systemic Human Rights Violations, 20 U. PENN. J.L. & Soc. 1,
20-21 (2017).
188. There is, of course, a huge literature addressing the debate over the definition
of terrorism, and what conduct comes within the scope of terrorist activity. For
discussion of the problem, see generally, for example, Sarah V. Marsden, Typologies of
Terrorism and Political Violence, in THE

ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM

RESEARCH (Alex P. Schmid ed., 2011); Ben Saul, Attempts to Define 'Terrorism' in
InternationalLaw, 52 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 57 (2005).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
190. GRAY, supra note 21, at 163-65; RUYS, supra note 3, at 178. But see DINSTEIN
AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 210-11. Even the British inquiry into the 2015 targeted
killing of Reynard Khan questioned the validity of this accumulation of strikes
conception of armed attack. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GOVERNMENT'S
POLICY ON THE USE OF DRONES FOR TARGETED KILLING, 2015-16, HC 574, HL Paper 141,

at 44 (UK).
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the conception of armed attack articulated in the principles, it does not
provide any standards for determining where to draw the line
regarding the number of such low-level strikes and what level or scale
of violence or damage would be necessary to constitute an armed attack
in aggregate. Thus, even as we can appreciate the policy imperatives,
we must question the manner in which the doctrine is trying to lower
the bar to permit the exercise of self-defense in response to a series of
such low-level attacks, because it would lower the bar for all purposes,
for the use of force against states as well as against terrorists. A series
of small border incidents, or naval incursions by one state into the
territorial waters of another, months or even years apart, could all of a
sudden be taken in the aggregate as an "armed attack" putatively
justifying a use of force in self-defense, leading to an escalating
international armed conflict.
Even if one were to accept the proposition that a series of lowintensity terrorist attacks can cumulatively rise to the level of
constituting an armed attack, thereby triggering the right of selfdefense, it is not consistent with the other way in which the concept of
armed attack is used to justify the uses of force against NSAs in
nonconsenting states. The United States and other target states have
been in the practice of explaining each such use of force as an
independent act of self-defense in response to an actual or imminent
armed attack.1 9 ' In other words, each one of a series of drone strikes
some weeks or months apart against NSAs in Pakistan, each of which
constitutes a use of force against a nonconsenting state, is separately
justified as an act of self-defense against an independent imminent
armed attack. But the imminent attacks to which each one of these
drone strikes is responding consist of sporadic, low-level terrorist
activity, and thus do not individually rise to the level of an "armed
attack."1 9 2 As was just examined, it is precisely to get around this
apparent problem that target states have argued, backed up by the
Bethlehem Principles, that an accumulation of small strikes, no one of
which might be sufficient to constitute an armed attack, can form a
pattern of strikes that in aggregate can satisfy the test for armed
attack.19 3 But even if we were to accept that these two arguments could
each be plausible on their own, they become far less so when they are
taken together, as they must be. Each use of force in response to a lowscale strike cannot be an individual act of self-defense against an

191. US LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS, supra note 2; DoJ White Paper, supra
note 149.
192. For discussion of the threshold for armed attack, see sources cited supranotes
182-185 and accompanying text.
193. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 774-75; see, e.g.,
Taft, supranote 181.
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imminent armed attack, when at the same time it is argued that each
strike that is being defended against does not individually rise to the
level of armed attack but constitutes one armed attack when
aggregated with others. These two claims are internally incoherent,
and yet they are provided for in the principles as a way of lowering the
threshold for the exercise of self-defense against NSAs in
nonconsenting states.1 94 And in the process, they lower the bar to the
use of force in self-defense against states as well.
D. The Conflation of Jus ad Bellum with Other Regimes
The fourth major problem with the Bethlehem Principles relates
to the relationship between jus ad bellum and other regimes in
international law, specifically IHL and the law of state responsibility.
The Bethlehem Principles conflate rules and principles from these
different regimes in ways that threaten to undermine the nature of the
well-established relationships between jus ad bellum and both IHL
and the law of state responsibility and weaken the integrity and
coherence of all three distinct legal regimes.
As explained above, Principles Six and Seven of the Bethlehem
Principles provide that the target state may use force against all those
actively planning, threatening, or perpetrating armed attacks, as well
as those who are reasonably believed to be taking direct part in those
attacks through the provision of material support essential to the
95
attacks.s
Bethlehem explicitly explained that this is separate and
apart from the IHL rule governing the targeting of those taking direct
part in hostilities.1 96 Yet this proposition, that target states may, in
accordance with the authority conferred by principles of jus ad bellum
under the unwilling or unable doctrine, target individuals who provide
"material support essential to armed attacks," is inconsistent with both
the IHL rule itself, and with the long established relationship between

194. The analysis is complicated further by differences in view on the extent to
which each strike against the nonconsenting state triggers an international armed
conflict. The United States takes the minority view that such strikes do not trigger an
international armed conflict at all. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, When Does the Use of Force
Against a Non-State Armed Group Trigger an InternationalArmed Conflict and Why
Does it Matter?, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/when-does-the-useof-force-against-a-non-state-armed-group-trigger-an-international-armed-conflict-andwhy-does-this-matter/ [https://perma.cclXTX7-EF2L] (archived Feb. 7, 2019) (discussing
the debate); Paust, supranote 44.
195. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 774.
196. Id.
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the jus ad bellum and IHL regimes. It is the lex specialis of IHL, not
jus ad bellum, that dictates who may be targeted in armed conflict.
Under the rules of IHL, "civilians," a term of art that includes
effectively anyone who is not a "combatant" in an international armed
conflict as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, cannot be
targeted "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."19 7 What precisely constitutes the parameters for defining
the scope of "taking a direct part in hostilities," and thus who can be
targeted and when they can be targeted, is heavily debated in
98
Moreover, there is some
academic, operational, and judicial writing.
terrorist organizations
transnational
of
members
whether
over
debate
who are continuously engaged in hostilities should be properly
classified as something akin to "combatant"-the leading proposed
status is that of "continuous combat function"-rather- than as
"civilian." 99 Nonetheless, these are first and foremost concepts of IHL,
and these debates must be resolved by reference to principles and
0
concepts internal to the IHL regime.2 0 Principles Six and Seven of the
Bethlehem Principles would purport to trump IHL rules on who may
and may not be targeted by providing separate, and presumably
superior, authority for targeting members of NSAs who might not be
20 1
The idea that individuals could
targetable under the rules of IHL.
would suggest a standard
support"
"material
providing
be targeted for
under virtually all
acceptable
be
would
which
that
below
that is far
in IHL. If this
hostilities"
in
part
"direct
a
taking
conceptions of
standard from the Bethlehem Principles were to be accepted as law,
there would be the risk that IHL andjus ad bellum would thus provide
conflicting rules on who could be lawfully targeted in the circumstances
202
That would
of uses of force against NSAs in nonconsenting states.

197.

Geneva Conventions, supra note 49, at common art. 4; Additional Protocol I,

supra note 48, arts. 50, 51(3); WILLAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 141-64
(2012); HENCKAERTS, CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note 47, at 17-19; INTL COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 41-68 (2009).
198. See, e.g., DINSTEIN NIAC, supra note 49, at 121-25, 146-52; HENCKAERTS,

CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note 47, at 17-24; Nilz Melzer, The Principle of Distinction
Between Civiliansand Combatants, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN ARMED CONFLICT 296 (2013).

199. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 198; see also The Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. Israel, HCJ 769/02 (2002) (Sup. Ct. Israel); Curtis A. Bradley, The
United States, Israel, and Unlawful Combatants, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 397 (2009).
200. See sources cited supra note 50 (discussing the relationship between IHL and
jus ad bellum).
201. DINSTEIN NIAC, supra note 49, at 3.
202. Wilmshurst and Wood similarly criticized this aspect of Principle Seven as
being in violation of both jus ad bellum and IHL. Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Michael Wood,
Self-Defense Against Nonstate Actors: Reflections on the "Bethlehem Principles,"107 AM.
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be profoundly problematic, not merely because of the resulting erosion
of protections for civilians, as well as the uncertainty and instability
created around these specific rules of IHL, but because it would
potentially undermine the nature of the relationship between jus ad
bellum and IHL more generally.
There is a similar problem with the manner in which the
Bethlehem Principles appear to imply some importation of principles
from the law of state responsibility for purposes of assessing lawfulness
under the jus ad bellum regime. Specifically, Bethlehem in his article
suggested that the law of state responsibility may apply, and in
Principle Eleven stated that the extent of the responsibility of the
harboring or colluding territorial state, for its failure to neutralize the
threat emanating from within its territory, may impact whether the
target state need seek explicit consent for the use of force. 203 Others
have similarly invoked the notion of state responsibility in explaining
the doctrine. 204 As I will explain later in this Part, even the reliance
upon the "inability" of the territorial state to prevent NSA activity as
a justification for the use of force is an implicit conflation of state
responsibility with jus ad bellum.2 05 This apparent reliance upon state
responsibility in elaborating the rationale for the unwilling or unable
doctrine would seem to suggest that state responsibility can serve as
part of the justification for the use of force. If that is indeed the
intended meaning, however, it is not consistent with the doctrine of
self-defense or the jus ad bellum regime more generally. It either
reflects some confusion over the exact nature of the state responsibility
in question, or, more seriously, an attempt to use principles of the law
of state responsibility to lower the threshold for the justifiable use of
force in the doctrine of self-defense.
This does not mean to suggest that the law of state responsibility
is not implicated in the circumstances of armed groups launching
attacks against a state from within the territory of another state. To
be clear, it is indeed the case that a territorial state would incur
responsibility for either refusing or failing to prevent NSAs from
harming other states from within its territory. There is an
international legal obligation on states not to "allow knowingly [their]
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States,"

J. INT'L L. 390, 394 (2013). But see Benvenisti, supra note 50 (questioning the clear
distinction between jus ad bellum and IHL in conflicts with NSAs).
203. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 773, 774, 776.
204. See, e.g., Travalio & Altenburg, Terrorism and State Responsibility, supra
note 79, at 110, 116.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 224-227.
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which would include an obligation not to knowingly allow NSAs within
206
It is this obligation that
their territory to cause harm to other states.
of Principle Nine
purposes
for
the Bethlehem Principles incorporate
NSAs from
prevent
to
states
of
which articulates the obligation
207
of this
violation
The
territory.
launching attacks from within their
to
failure
The
responsibility.
state
specific obligation will thus attract
to
responsibility
state
attracting
prevent harm constitutes a violation
20 8
There
state.
of
the
act
affirmative
the same extent as some unlawful
is nothing incorrect or controversial about the Bethlehem Principles
articulating this form of state responsibility on the part of a state
unwilling or unable to prevent the materialization of threats from an
209
NSA operating within its territory.
It is important, however, to be very clear that the finding of state
responsibility in the situation just described does not depend upon an
attribution to the state of any of the unlawful acts of the NSAs. The
violation of international law that is at issue here, for purposes of
triggering the responsibility of a territorial state that is unwilling or
unable to neutralize the threat posed by an NSA, is precisely and only
the failure to fulfill its obligation to prevent the NSA use of its territory
in ways that cause harm to others. And that violation and
corresponding responsibility can in no way justify a use of force under
well-established understanding of both the law of state responsibility
and jus ad bellum.
The NSA is itself violating international law in launching attacks
against other states, but the territorial state is not responsible for
those violations of international law, unless and until the acts of the
NSA can be attributed to the territorial state.2 1 0 The law of state
responsibility does provide that states will be responsible when a
breach of an international legal obligation by an NSA is attributable to

206.

The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22 (Apr.

9); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 158 (2013).

More specifically, with regard to terrorist activity, see S.C. Res. 748 (Mar. 31, 1992); S.C.
Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
207. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 776.
208. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment,
2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, TT 428-38 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide Convention Case];see also
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 1/56/10,
art. 14(3) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles]; CRAWFORD, supra note 206, at 217-18, 22630; Kristen E. Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in
Attribution Doctrines, 15 MELB. J. INT'L L. 330, 363-64 (2014).
209 CRAWFORD, supra note 206, at 226-7 and 405-06 (noting the distinction
between the standard for liability for failing to prevent and that for complicity, in the
context of proving aid or assistance in the commission of a breach).
210. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 208, arts. 4-11; see also CRAWFORD, supranote
206, at 146-56.
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the state, and there is a specific test for determining such
attribution.211 If the actions of the NSA can be attributed to the
territorial state in accordance with the law of state responsibility, then
the territorial state is actually responsible for two distinct violations:
first, failing to prevent harm to another state from emanating from
within its territory as explained above; and second, for the actual
violations of international law committed by the NSA. Where the acts
of the NSA rise to the level of armed attack on another state, then this
will be a violation of the rules of jus ad bellum, and if attributable to
the territorial state, it will be responsible for such violation. 212 But it
must be emphasized that the state responsibility that is being referred
to in the discussion of the unwilling or unable doctrine would appear
to be the first, not the second. Because if the acts of the NSA can be
attributed to the state, in accordance with the rules of the law of state
responsibility, then they can also almost certainly be attributed to the
territorial state for purposes of the doctrine of self-defense, thus
justifying the use of force against that state under the principles of jus
ad bellum, and reference to state responsibility would be entirely
unnecessary. 213 So the reference to state responsibility in the
Bethlehem Principles would appear to be trying to add some additional
basis for the use of force, and it is this that is improper.
I
To explain this last point further, the tests for attribution under
state responsibility and under the doctrine of self-defense are at once
quite independent of one another, but nonetheless similar. Both the
differences and the similarities matter. The acts of an NSA can be
attributed to the state for purposes of state responsibility if, among
other things, it is "in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct," or where
the NSA is "in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority"

211. Genocide Convention Case, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶¶ 385-415; ILC Draft Articles,
supra note 208, art. 8; CRAWFORD, supra note 206, at 146-56.
212. See GRAY, supra note 21, at 139-45; RUYS, supra 3, at 226 (discussing
attribution for purposes of self-defense); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, TT 194-95 (June 27);
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 1, TT 106-47 (Dec. 19); see also Paddeu, supranote
45.
213. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 208, arts. 5, 8, 9 (discussing attribution for
purposes of state responsibility); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 206, at 146-56. This
assumes, of course, that the NSA is not in fact an organ of the territorial state, or an
organ of another state placed at the disposal of the territorial state. ILC Draft Articles,
supranote 208, arts. 5-7.
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in place of the government of the territorial state. 214 The actions of an
NSA can also be attributed to the state within which it is operating if
the state ex post "acknowledges and adopts" the conduct of the NSA as
its own.2 15 The fact that the conduct of an NSA can be attributed to the
state for purposes of the law of state responsibility, however, does not
by itself justify the use of force against the state. The idea that states
may use force as a form of countermeasure in response to violations of
international law ended with the modern UN system. 216 The
justification for the use of force must be found in the jus ad bellum
regime, not the law of state responsibility. 217 The traditional
understanding of jus ad bellum is that in order to justify the use of
force in self-defense against a state for the actions of NSAs acting
within its territory, the actions of the NSAs must rise to the level of
armed attack and be attributable to the state. 218 The ICJ has
repeatedly held that the test for attribution for purposes of selfdefense that is, for the purpose of justifying the use of force against
the state in which the NSAs are located-is that the territorial state
219
In the
was "substantially- involved" in the operations of the NSA.
of
Afghanistan
invasion
case of the use of force against al-Qaeda in the
after 9/11, for instance, both the US letter to the Security Council
pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, 220 and the Security Council
resolutions passed in relation to this use of force, characterized the
Taliban's acquiescence in the actions of al-Qaeda and their subsequent
refusal to take action against al-Qaeda as having constituted

214. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 208, arts. 5-9; see also CRAWFORD, supra note
206, at 146-56.
215. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 208, art. 11.
216. See, e.g., NEFF, supra note 23, at 318; see also ILC Draft Articles, supra note
208, arts. 21-22. But see DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 269 (arguing that
"defensive armed reprisals can be a permissible form of self-defence").
217.

CRAWFORD, supra note 206.

218. GRAY, supra note 21.
219. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 194-95 (June 27); Case Concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 106-47 (Dec. 19) (explaining, based on the facts presented by Uganda,
that Uganda was not acting in self-defense); GRAY, supra note 21, at 139-45, 226. It is
worth noting that the "effective control" test that was also elaborated in Nicaraguawas
to assess the attribution of NSA (Contra) violations of IHL to the controlling state (the
United States), for purposes of state responsibility-not to determine attribution for
purposes of justifying the use of force in self-defense or even the use of force. Nicaragua,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 115. Scholars continue to confuse this issue, writing that the
"effective control" test was employed by the Court in Nicaragua to assess whether US
support for the Contras constituted an unlawful use of force. See, e.g., Travalio, supra
note 79, at 103. This is wrong.
220. Letter from John Negroponte, Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., to the President of
the Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001), http://avalon.law.yale.edulseptll/un_006.asp
[https://perma.cc/TVM2-ZWEZ] (archived Feb. 17, 2019).
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sufficiently "substantial involvement" so as to ground attribution of alQaeda's actions to Afghanistan. 221 As I will return to below, the jus ad
bellum attribution test is an important factor in considering the extent
to which a state is "unwilling," and the nature of unwillingness that
should justify the use of force-for at some point the unwillingness of
the territorial state to either deal with the NSA threat or consent to
the target state taking such action within its territory, will rise to the
level of support that constitutes "substantial involvement" in the
NSA's activity, and thus a traditional justification for use of force in
self-defense.
In sum, the two tests of attribution are conceptually distinct, but
the tests for each of them are fairly similar. 222 Both are difficult to
establish, and the reality is that if one cannot establish attribution of
NSA conduct to the state for purposes of state responsibility, it is also
unlikely that one will be able to attribute the conduct to the state for
purposes of self-defense. On the other hand, if the acts of the NSA can
be attributed to the territorial state for purposes of state responsibility,
it will almost certainly be the case that the acts will also be attributable
to the state for purposes of self-defense. But if the NSA attacks cannot
be attributed to the state, then the territorial state will be responsible
only for the violation of the obligation not to allow its territory to be
used to the detriment of other states-and that state responsibility
cannot be any justification for the use of force against the territorial
state. 223

221. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 1 139 (July 9). The LCJ
interpreted these resolutions in this restrictive fashion. See also, GRAY, supra note 21,
at 193-94, 199. But see DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 207; LUBELL, supra note

3, at 35.
222. Having said that, one difference between them is suggestive of the
incoherence of the attempt to rely upon state responsibility. State responsibility is only
incurred upon the actual violation of an international legal obligation, not in anticipation
of it. Thus, while the jus ad bellum is understood by many to permit an exercise of
anticipatory self-defense in response to an imminent armed attack from an NSA if the
actions of the NSA can be attributed to the state in which it is operating, no state
responsibility will be incurred by that territorial state unless and until an armed attack
is actually launched. Even if state responsibility could ever justify the use of force, it
certainly could not justify the use of force for future violations. This further underlines
the confusion created by the apparent attempts to conflate and selectively employ
principles from different regimes in an effort to justify responses to terrorist attacks. My
thanks to VLadyslav Lanovoy for bringing this point to my attention.
223. SHAW, supra note 135, at 605-06. For the ICJ articulation of the law of state
responsibility and countermeasures, see Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, T 57 (Sept. 25) (explaining Hungary's failure to comply
with treaty obligations and the unavailability of necessity as a defense).
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The foregoing discussion of attribution and the distinction
* between the law of state responsibility andjus ad bellum also points to
another problem with the unwilling or unable doctrine, which is the
extent to which it suggests that inability alone can constitute a
justification for the use of force. 224 The very name of the doctrine
suggests that the target state may use force against an NSA whenever
the territorial state is either unwilling or unable to itself address the
threat. But this cannot be right. It cannot be the case that a target
state is entitled to use force against another state (or within the
225
territory of another state, for those who try to make this distinction)
exclusively because that state does not have the ability to respond to a
threat posed by an NSA within its territory. This would be to import
the low standard of due diligence that does operate in the law of state
responsibility into jus ad bellum. 2 26 But the jus ad bellum regime does
not provide for any such near strict liability. There must be something
in addition to the mere inability to prevent harm to justify a use of
force. As already explained above, the traditional jus ad bellum
position requires that the armed attacks (or imminent threat of such
attacks) by an NSA be attributable to the state in order to justify the
target state exercising a right to use force in self-defense against the
territorial state. 2 27 States cannot use force against the blameless (in
jus ad bellum terms), and to be merely incapable of dealing with the
NSA is no violation of the principles of jus ad bellum. As indicated
above, it may constitute a violation of other obligations, thus attracting
state responsibility, but that cannot justify a use of force. This is
another way in which the principles implicitly import state
responsibility into what should be strictly considerations of jus ad
bellum. And to be fair, the Bethlehem Principles recognize this
initially, by requiring the target state to present the territorial state
with a plan of action, and to seek consent to do what the territorial
state is incapable of doing, namely neutralizing the threat posed by the
NSA. 228 In the event that the unable territorial state so consents, the
target state's actions against the NSA do not constitute a use of force

224. Dire Tladi is similarly critical of this aspect of the Principles. Dire Tiadi, The
Nonconsenting Innocent State: The Problem with Bethlehem's Principle 12, 107 AM. J.
INT'LL. 570, 576 (2013).
225. See, e.g., Mahmoud Hmoud, Are New PrinciplesReally Needed? The Potential
of the Established DistinctionBetween Responsibility for Attacks by NonstateActors and
the Law of Self-Defense, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 576, 577-78 (2013).
226. CRAWFORD, supra note 206, at 369 (on strict liability in law of state
responsibility).
227. On attribution for purposes of state responsibility, see ILC Draft Articles,
supra note 206, arts. 4-11; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 206, at 146-156.
228. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 776.
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against the territorial state, and the unwilling or unable doctrine is
irrelevant.
If the "unable" territorial state refuses to consent, however, then
it thereby becomes "unwilling," and moves along the spectrum toward
"colluding" or "harboring." 229 In this case, such a nonconsenting
territorial state moves closer to being a state to which the actions of
the NSA can actually be attributed for purposes of jus ad bellum, as in
the case of the Taliban regime when it refused to address the threat of
al-Qaeda after 9/11.230 In short, the use of force against the NSA within
the territorial state cannot be justified by the mere fact that the state
is unable to deal with the threat, but may be justified by the fact that
the state is unwilling to permit the threat to be addressed by the target
state. This is somewhat analogous to the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) doctrine for humanitarian intervention. Just as states may lose
some of their sovereign rights under R2P by reason of their causing or
failing to address humanitarian disasters within their territory, here
the territorial state may be said to forfeit some of its sovereign rights
due to its unwillingness to either take action or to consent to such
action to prevent terrorist attacks. In jus ad bellum terms, it thereby
becomes substantially involved in the acts of the NSA-and only then
is a use of force against that state in self-defense justified. 232 In
essence then, the "unwilling or unable" doctrine should really be
understood as being only an "unwilling" doctrine-or the "unwilling, or
unable and unwilling." But even if the Doctrine were so interpreted or
recharacterized, there remains the problem that the Bethlehem
Principles walk back from the presumption that the target state must
present to the territorial state an assessment of the threat, a plan of
action, and a request for consent. It is to that problem that we turn
next.
E. Self-JudgingArmed Attack, Necessity, and Unwillingness
The Bethlehem Principles do not provide sufficient guidance as to
how and by whom a series of determinations are to be made, as part of
the process of deciding on the use of force against NSAs located in

229. Id.
230. See supra text accompanying note 221.
232. Rosa Brooks makes this connection between R2P and the unwilling or unable
doctrine in BROOKS, supra note 11, at 245-52. See also Paddeu, supra note 45,
(explaining that if a use of force is justifiable as self-defense injus ad bellum terms, then
self-defense also operates as a separate circumstance precluding wrongfulness under the
law of state responsibility to justify or excuse the other violations of international law in
relation to the rights and interests of the territorial state that will also likely be caused
by the use of force - a point that is often overlooked by advocates of the "use of force
within" not "use of force against" argument).

436

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:387

another state. By "whom" here I am questioning whether the doctrine
does or should authorize that the decisions be made by the target state
alone, or by the target state after consultation with and input from the
territorial state. And by "how," I am questioning whether there are
standards, beyond the bare "reasonable and objective basis," according
to which decisions are to be made, and later assessed for legitimacy.
Before turning to these issues of "how" and "by whom," however, it is
important to first unpack and identify each of the more significant
determinations that have to be made-for as I will argue later, these
decisions should not all be subject to the same standards. One of the
weaknesses of the Bethlehem Principles is that they aggregate most of
these decisions and imply that they are all subject to a single
"reasonable and objective basis" standard (adding only "strong' to the
233
one decision of whether there is excessive risk in asking for consent).
The distinct decisions buried in the principles include: (i) that the NSA
has launched, or poses a threat of launching, strikes that rise to the
level of an armed attack; (ii) that the use of force is necessary to prevent
the launching or continuation of attacks, which, in the event of future
attacks, rests on a related determination that the threatened attack is
imminent; (iii) that the territorial state is unwilling to prevent the
attacks-which in turn requires a more specific determination that
either (a) the territorial state is both unable to address the threat itself
and is unwilling to provide consent for the target state to take the
necessary action, or (b) that the territorial state, while able to do so, is
unwilling to prevent the attacks or consent to the target state doing so,
and is thereby actually "harboring" or "colluding with" the NSA.234
What is more, the "unwillingness" determination needs to be unpacked
further: the principles contemplate determinations of unwillingness
after a request for action or consent has been made and denied, and
unilateral determinations of unwillingness or consent by way of
inference. 235 Each of these may require different standards. As will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV below, a far more stringent
standard should be required to justify an inference of unwillingness
than for determining that a request for consent has been unreasonably
denied.
The inferences of "unwillingness" or "consent" also involve some
prior judgments. That is, the principles suggest that a prior
determination must be made by the target state as to whether it is
required to explicitly request that the territorial state take action or

233. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775-76. The "strong,
reasonable, and objective basis" standard is also used in Principle 7 as the basis for
targeting those providing material support for armed attacks. Id.
234. See supra Part IID.
235. See Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775-76.
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consent to such action in the circumstances, or whether it is permitted
to forgo such requests and unilaterally make inferences as to the
unwillingness of the territorial state. 2 36 The inference of unwillingness
thus theoretically involves two distinct determinations-namely the
determination by the state that it is entitled in the circumstances to
make such an inference, and then the drawing of the substantive
inference itself. But in practical terms these two distinct
determinations begin to collapse into one. Both decisions are based on
the same evidence and conclusions. The evidence that forms a
sufficient basis for the decision that the territorial state is unwilling to
either take action or consent to action is going to also form the basis
for the decision that the target state is entitled to make that very
inference. 237 The same is true of the inference of consent. Thus, the
question will be what standard should apply to the combined
determination that the territorial state is unwilling to assist or
consent, and that such a unilateral inference is permitted in the
circumstances. But that standard arguably should be different from
the standard for determining whether the target state can reasonably
determine that the territorial state is unwilling, based on its explicit
denial of a request for action or consent to permit a use of force against
the NSA. For short, I will refer to the categories of substantive decision
points as (i) "armed attack," (ii) "necessity/imminence," (iii) "explicit
unwillingness," and (iv) "inference of unwillingness/consent."
A problem with the Bethlehem Principles is that they do not
sufficiently consider the differences between these distinct decisions,
and thus purport to subject them all to a similar standard. Part IV will
take up the issue of how we might think about developing different
standards to govern these distinct decisions, but it is worth pausing
here to consider why varied standards are theoretically necessary. To
begin with the categories of "armed attack" and "necessity/imminence,"
these are already part of the doctrine of self-defense, and yet they are
modified in the context of the unwilling or unable doctrine. 238 The jus
ad bellum regime implicitly contemplates that states are entitled to
determine for themselves that they are the victim of an actual or
imminent armed attack, and that the use of force in response is
necessary.23 9 The presumption is that states may and will make these

236. Id. at 776 (explaining in what circumstances the requirement for consent is
inapplicable).
237. Id.
238. See supra Part II.A.
239. This can be traced back to the exchange of diplomatic notes during the
negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. See FORCESE, supra note 65, at 185-86, and
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decisions unilaterally. Such decisions are, however, typically subject to
ex post assessment of one kind or another, and the defending state
usually feels compelled to furnish the international community with
arguments and evidence in justification of its actions. 240 The
determination of these very same issues is slightly different, however,
in the context of the unwilling or unable doctrine, because there is the
explicit presumption, provided for in Principle Ten, that the target
state should first request that the territorial state either take action or
consent to the target state doing so. 241 Notwithstanding how the
principles walk back from this presumption, it should be understood to
alter the nature of the standards that govern the decision-making. For
it needs to be said yet again that the presumption reflects the fact that
the territorial state may be "innocent" in the sense of having done
nothing to encourage or assist the NSA action-and so the evidentiary
burden for establishing that it is in some way culpable should be high
for justifying any violation of its sovereign rights for the purpose of
attacking the NSA without the state's consent. It certainly cannot be
the case, therefore, that the standards governing these decisions would
be lower than those that apply to a defending state in a straightforward
exercise of self-defense against an attack by another state.
Turning to the third category, of "explicit unwillingness," recall
again that Principle Ten establishes a baseline presumption that the
target state must obtain consent for the use of force from the territorial
state, and that "all reasonable good faith efforts be made to obtain"
such consent. 242 Principle Twelve, the "unable" Principle, even
provides that if consent is requested, the target state must provide to
the territorial state a reasonable plan of action to deal with the NSA,
243
But Principles
and seek its consent to the execution of the plan.
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contemplate this circumstance explicitly, but they would seem to imply
that such refusal would by definition make the territorial state
"unwilling," thereby "colluding" with or "harboring" the NSA. But this
too needs to be unpacked. What if the territorial state does not agree
with the target state's assessment that the NSA poses a risk of

nn.40-42. For the notes exchanged, see DENYS P. MYERS, ORIGIN AND CONCLUSION OF
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(1933)

(containing

reproductions of all the associated documents, including the US note of June 23, 1928).
240. Consider the examples of Colin Powell addressing the Security Council on the
eve of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Colin Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State, Address to the U.N.
Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/
iraq.usa [https://perma.cc/ETD9-96WZ] (archived Feb. 17, 2019).
241.

Id.

242.
243.

Id. at 776.
Id. at 775-76.
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imminent armed attack? Or that the use of force is necessary to prevent
such attack? Indeed, what evidence is the target state required to
provide to the territorial state in the process of requesting action or
consent? Which judgment should prevail in making the determinations
of armed attack, imminence, and thus necessity? This raises both
"how" and "by whom" issues. If the target state has complete authority
to decide to act regardless of the territorial state's position on these
issues, then the request for consent is not a consultation in any
meaningful sense, but merely an ultimatum: "take action or consent
immediately, or we will undertake strikes in your territory regardless."
It is worth recalling that the Taliban requested, as a precondition
for turning over Osama Bin Laden, evidence from the United States to
support its claim that al-Qaeda was responsible for the 9/11 attacks,
and that the United States refused to provide any such evidence. 244
The fact that it is now almost universally accepted that al-Qaeda was
responsible for the 9/11 attack, and that the 9/11 attacks did constitute
an armed attack on the United States, does not mean that the request
for evidence was unjustified, or that the United States had no
obligation to provide such evidence before using force against
Afghanistan. Yet while the Bethlehem Principles again do not address
these questions directly, it seems quite clear that the doctrine is
understood to permit the target state to make most if not all of these
determinations for itself unilaterally, each one governed by the same
relatively low reasonableness standard.2 4 5 There seems to be little
recognition that territorial states may have a reasonable basis for
protesting that a use of force is not necessary or justified in the
circumstances. Moreover, there is no contemplation of any ex post
assessment of which view was the more reasonable view in the
circumstances, if the target state makes its own determination and
acts upon it over the objections of the territorial state.
This brings us to the final category, the "inference of
unwillingness/consent." Recall that Principle Twelve provides that
consent to the use of force by the target state is not required where the
territorial state is unable to itself address the threat, and there is a
"strong, reasonable, and objective basis" for concluding that

244. See, e.g., Bush rejects Taliban offer to hand Bin Laden over, THE GUARDIAN,
(Oct. 14, 2001), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/14/afghanistan.terrorism5
[https:/perma.cc/24QJ-EFBJ] (archived Mar. 13, 2019); President George W. Bush,
Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
[https://perma.cc/VG3U-H8JW] (archived Feb. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Bush]
245. See generally Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16.
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attempting to seek consent would materially increase the risk that the
use of force will be ineffective (primarily due to suspicion that the
territorial state will tip off the NSA). 246 This suggests that the target
state is entitled to both infer that the territorial state is "unable" and
to determine that requesting consent poses too great a risk. As
discussed above, the idea that this alone would permit the use of force
is entirely inconsistent with the traditional understanding of jus ad
bellum, 24 7 and so to interpret it in a manner that is consistent with
established law, the Principle should also be understood to mean that
the target state has the basis for making the further inference that the
unable state is also unwilling to permit the target state to take action.
As we have seen, Principle Eleven provides for just such an inference,
stating that the target state need not obtain consent where there is a
"reasonable and objective basis'' for concluding that the territorial state
is either "harboring" or "colluding with" the NSA, and is thus unwilling
to either take action or provide consent to the target state's action
(though, again, the Principle does not explicitly indicate who is to so
conclude). 248 Finally, Principle Thirteen adds that the territorial
state's consent to a target state use of force within its borders may be
249
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These unilateral decisions or inferences should surely be
understood to be governed by stricter standards than the standard that
applies to self-judgment in the traditional doctrine of self-defense.
What is more, in contrast to the operation of the traditional doctrine of
self-defense, in which there is typically some form of explanation and
disclosure as part of a process of justification, the unwilling or unable
doctrine is typically invoked in circumstances in which target states
make virtually no disclosure. The United States has refused to disclose
the legal analysis justifying its targeted killing program in general,
and in the specific instances in which it has invoked the unwilling or
unable doctrine, it has done so with bald assertions of the imminence

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 224-231.
Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 775.
See supra Part II.D.
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of attack and necessity of self-defense, with no supporting evidence. 250
The greatest disclosure has been the legal analysis justifying the
killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, 25 1 but it was both reluctant and was the
exception, with both the analysis and the reasons for its disclosure
being driven primarily by the fact that al-Awlaki was an American
national. 25 2 This lack of transparency regarding the decision-making
suggests that there should be additional standards regarding levels of
disclosure and ex post justification, as well as an understanding that
the less transparency there is, the stricter the standards governing the
decision-making itself should be.
The failure to more fully address how and by whom all of these
distinct determinations are to be made, and the strong bias in favor of
the interests of powerful target states over the rights of weak
territorial states, is a structural weakness that has already manifested
itself in uses of force that are very difficult to reconcile with the
traditional doctrine of self-defense. 253 As Deeks wrote before the
publication of the Bethlehem Principles, "where the test is not clear, a
victim state's claim that a territorial state is unwilling or unable to act
is easy to make, relatively hard to disprove, and at least superficially
useful in concealing an incursion based on other motivations." 254 The
Bethlehem Principles have not added sufficient clarity to resolve this
problem. Notwithstanding the recognition that there should be a
presumption of consultation and request for consent, the principles
entirely undermine this presumption. They tend to lump all the
determinations together, entirely obscuring some of them, treating all
of them as being within the sole preserve of target state self-judgment,
and suggesting that all but one of them is subject to the low standard
of "objective and reasonable basis." 255 The principles provide no
guidance as to how that standard should be actually applied, or to what
extent it should be susceptible to ex post review.

250. See BROOKS, supra note 11, at 104-28 (discussing the lack of transparency
and secrecy of the policy).
251. This attack was arguably undertaken with Yemini consent, or at least
without objection, and so did not require invocation of the unwilling or unable doctrineyet the analysis did nonetheless rely on self-defense arguments. President Ali Saleh, who
had resisted US air operations in Yemen, had been the victim of rocket attack in June,
2011. Al-Awlaki was killed in the months that followed, during which there was
something of a vacuum in Yemini government leadership. See MAZZETTI KNIFE, supra

note 156, at 305-08.
252.

See, e.g., MAZZETTI KNIFE, supra note 156, at 299-320; SCAHILL, supra note

156, at chs. 44, 56, 57.
253. See RUYS, supra note 3, at 10.
254. Deeks Unwilling, supra note 7, at 507.
255. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16.
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IV. REFINING THE DOCTRINE

How then should the doctrine be refined? There have been various
suggestions in response to the publication of the Bethlehem principles.
Some scholars have written that communication between the target
and territorial states is necessary, and that the target state must be
ready to provide ex post any evidence supporting its determination that
25 6
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the territorial state was indeed unwilling or unable.
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commend it as a basis for improving the Bethlehem Principles.
Others have suggested that some, independent international
258
organizations should be involved in the determination ex ante. But
the target states that have most commonly relied upon the doctrinenamely the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia in
recent years-are highly unlikely to accept any delegation of the
decision-making process to an international body ex ante, and will be
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taken together serve to dangerously undermine the prohibition on the
use of force more generally, and thus all need to be addressed. They
need to be revised or refined in order to bring them into closer
compliance with the established understanding of jus ad bellum and
its relationship with both IHL and the law of state responsibility, and
to establish clearer standards on how and by whom the relevant
decisions are made. This Part is devoted to exploring some suggestions
on how this might be done.
A. Restoring the Integrity of Jus ad Bellum
The initial step is to revise those aspects of the Bethlehem
Principles that are inconsistent with the jus ad bellum regime and its

256. See, e.g., Irene Couzigou, The Right to Self-Defence against Non-State Actors:
Criteriaof the "Unwilling or Unable" Test, 1 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 47, 47-49 (2017).
257. Deeks Unwilling, supra note 7, at 519.
258. Ahmed, supra note 14, at 36.
259. See, e.g., Wright Self-defense, supra note 57; Moorehead, supra note 128.
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relationship with other bodies of international law. As explained in
Part III, while these inconsistencies pose serious threats to the jus ad
bellum regime and the integrity of its relationships with other regimes,
these aspects of the principles yet are not central to the operation of
the doctrine, so could be eliminated or revised without compromising
the doctrine. Thus, a first step would be to reject entirely those parts
of the Bethlehem Principles that interfere with or purport to trump the
rules of IHL.2 60 This can be solved by the deletion or revision of those
clauses in Principles Six and Seven that purport to establish separate
and independent authority for the targeting of individuals who are
planning, threatening, or providing support essential to a terrorist
attack. 261 It must be recognized that even in the event that an
international armed conflict is not already in existence between the
target state and territorial state, the very act of using force in selfdefense triggers the operation of IHL, and thus IHL governs the
conduct of armed forces in all aspects of targeting. 26 2 The principles
should be revised to clarify that the doctrine does not purport to
interfere in any way with IHL rules. Similarly, the references to the
law of state responsibility should be deleted, as they run the risk of
improperly suggesting that state responsibility may contribute to the
justifications for the use of force in some circumstances. 263 The
essential question should be whether the unwillingness of the
territorial state rises to the level of collusion with, control over, or
substantial involvement with the NSA, so as to justify the use of force
in self-defense against the state for the actions of the NSA. The
principles should make clear that this is exclusively a jus ad bellum
264
question, not a state responsibility issue.
The meaning of the concept of imminence also needs to be revised.
First, the current formulation needs to be adjusted so as not to
undermine the integrity of the principle of necessity in the doctrine of
self-defense. 265 But at the same time, the revision could take seriously
the concerns that the Bethlehem Principles and target state policy seek
to address. The doctrine could be revised to adopt some version of the

260.
261.

See supra Part III.D.
Id.

262.

DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 156-68; NEFF, supra note 23, at

340-46, 366-69. IHL would apply regardless of whether one argued the strikes were part
of an international or a non-international armed conflict. Indeed, if there is no armed
conflict and IHL is not operating, then the target state cannot make recourse to IHL for
legal authority to engage in lethal operations in the territorial state at all, and any such
operations would be governed by the stricter standards of domestic criminal law and
international human rights law. MELZER, TARGETED KILLING, supra note 3, at 80-81.

263.
264.
265.

See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part III.B.
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true "last clear chance" formulation, such that target states would not
always be required to have proof that an attack was immediately
pending before being justified in responding with force. But this
revised formulation would still have to include a temporal concept tied
directly to the principle of necessity. And it would not overly privilege
target states at the expense of the rights of territorial states or operate
in ways that would likely lead to unnecessary uses of force. It should
require compelling evidence that: (i) the NSA in question had decided
upon and was capable of implementing a specific armed attack, such
that there was considerable certainty that the attack would be
executed; (ii) notwithstanding that the attack was not immediately
pending, the immediate opportunity to use force that presented itself
was truly the last and only chance to prevent the threat from
materializing; and therefore (iii) there were no other alternatives
remaining to prevent the attack, and the immediate use of force was
necessary. That may seem like a high bar, but it does take seriously
the concerns reflected in the Bethlehem Principles, yet not at the
expense of the essential temporal meaning of the concept of imminence,
2 66
or its integral relationship to the principle of necessity.
The problems surrounding the definition and use of the concept of
"armed attack" should also be resolved. First, the issue of treating a
series of small-scale strikes as together constituting an armed attack
should be addressed. Some may argue that the current ICJ position on
the scale and intensity of force required to constitute an "armed attack"
is too high, and needs to be modified, particularly given the kinds of
threats posed by transnational terrorist organizations. 267 But such
arguments either disregard the fact that the modified concept of armed
attack will apply in all contexts of self-defense, or they assume without
any explanation that there should be a different and unique definition
268
If there is to be
for the concept when applied to the NSA context.
such a unique, context-specific definition, the rationale and
parameters of the concept should be clearly developed. In the absence
of any such bifurcation of the concept, any modification made for
purposes of addressing NSA threats will affect the operation of the
doctrine of self-defense in all other circumstances. And permitting the
use of force generally against another state in response to a series of
sporadic, low-scale, and low-intensity uses of force, such as border
skirmishes, could dangerously lower the threshold for war. 269 As
examined above, the jus ad bellum regime does not yet recognize the

266. See supra Part III.B.
267. See, e.g., DINSTEIN AGGRESSION, supra note 21, at 210.
268. There is currently no such distinction. RUYS, supra note 3, at 143-74.
269. See GRAY, supra note 21, at 155-57 (explaining which mix of events have
justified the use of force by the ICJ); RUYS, supra note 3, at 532-35.
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idea that a series of small-scale and low-intensity uses of force can in
the aggregate constitute an armed attack justifying the exercise of selfdefense, 270 and thus, in my view, the doctrine should be revised to
comply with the established law.
As to the second problem in relation to the concept of armed
attack, the unwilling or unable doctrine should not employ the concept
in ways that are internally incoherent. As explained above, one cannot
define armed attack as an accumulation of strikes that do not
individually rise to the level of armed attack, yet support the use of
force against each such strike as an act of self-defense against an
independent imminent armed attack. 2 71 For the doctrine to have a
chance of being accepted widely, champions of the doctrine must
develop rationales that are internally coherent and consistent with the
jus ad bellum regime more generally, and its relationship with IHL
and other regimes. And again, the operation of the doctrine need not
depend upon such incoherent positions. Under existing IHL, for
instance, once a target state has used force against an NSA within an
unwilling state, it thereby triggers an international armed conflict
with that state.2 7 2 If the NSA is preparing to launch further attacks,
the situation is akin to the continuation of hostilities in a more
traditional international armed conflict. As such, target state
responses to those strikes would be a continuation of the act of self,
defense, and the jus ad bellum regime would require an assessment of
necessity and proportionality in deciding whether and how to respond
to such pending strikes, but it would not require establishing anew
that the pending action by the NSA poses an "imminent armed attack"
justifying a use of force in self-defense. There is no need to justify each
use of force against NSA action as an independent act of self-defense.
And the threshold for determining the unwillingness of the state (a
topic addressed in more detail below) might be lower once it has
already been established to have been unwilling in the context of the
initial attacks.
It is true that so revising the principles to bring the treatment of
armed attack back into compliance with the established doctrine of
self-defense, and in accord with the relationship between jus ad bellum
and IHL, might disqualify some of the target state actions that have
been previously justified under the doctrine. But that merely
highlights the extent to which those strikes were likely illegitimate.
Revising the principles in this way would still allow the doctrine to

270. See sources cited supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part III.C.
272. Prosecutor v. Tldic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, T 84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
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operate, albeit within narrower parameters, but also with greater
legitimacy and wider acceptance.
B. Differentiated Standardsfor Distinct Target State Decisions
As explained in Part III, the aspect of the principles relating to
how and by whom each of the relevant determinations are to be made
is seriously underdeveloped, and thus revision requires elaboration as
well as refinement. Recall that these decisions were grouped into four
broad categories in Part III, namely: (i) armed attack; (ii)
necessity/imminence; (iii) explicit unwillingness; and (iv) an inference
of unwillingness/consent.2 73 The principles do not sufficiently provide
for differentiated standards to govern the decision-making process
underlying each of these determinations, in terms of the degree of
consultation and disclosure that is required, and on what criteria and
what levels of evidence the determination of unwillingness in
particular should be made. So how should they be refined?
It was noted in Part III that the determinations as to "armed
attack" and "necessity/imminence" are already part of the established
doctrine of self-defense and would be at a minimum subject to the same
standards as applies in the broader context. As will be explored in more
detail below, this includes being subject to a good faith standard, in
that these decisions must be made honestly and on an objective and
reasonable basis-yes, the same language used in the Bethlehem
Principles. But, as I have argued above, in contrast to the regular stateon-state exercise of self-defense, in the context of the unwilling or
unable doctrine the determinations of "armed attack" and
"'necessity/imminence" are not alone sufficient to justify the use of
force-there must also be the determination of territorial state
"unwillingness" in order to justify the use of force in the absence of
consent. 2 74 The determinations of unwillingness ought to be subject to
different and stricter standards.
Beginning with the issue of explicit unwillingness, recall that
Principle Ten provides for a presumption that the target state must
275
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273. See supra Part III.E.
274. See sources cited supra notes 224-231 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part II.D.
276. For a useful discussion of presumptions, albeit in the context of evidentiary
presumptions in adjudication, see FREDERIc GILLES SOURGENS, KABIR DUGGAL & IAN A.
LAIRD, EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATIONS, ch. 6 (2018).
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state as to the armed attack and necessity for the use of force
(disclosure standards), and (ii) standards for governing the basis upon
which the target state can disregard or effectively overrule the
territorial state's objection or denial (consultation standards). With
regards to the first, the target state must be required to provide
sufficiently compelling evidence to demonstrate that (i) its
determinations as to the threat of armed attack and necessity for the
use of force were made honestly, on a reasonable and objective basis,
and (ii) that there is a high probability that the conclusion is accuratenot merely likely. The target state may be reluctant to share
information that could reveal intelligence-gathering sources or
methods, 27 7 but on the other side of the equation is the territorial
state's sovereign right to be free from the use of force and foreign
intervention. It does not seem a reasonable balance that the more
powerful target state should be entitled to violate those sovereign
rights, often killing innocent civilians among the population of the
territorial state, 2 78 merely to minimize the risk of compromising its
own intelligence collection methods. The obligation to provide
sufficiently compelling evidence to ground the honesty and
reasonableness of the target state's determinations, and to
demonstrate that there is a high probability that such determinations
are accurate, should be made an explicit standard for the operation of
the doctrine where assistance or consent is requested.
The second aspect of the presumption to obtain consent, the
consultation standards, governs the extent to which the target state
has a duty to consider the territorial state's views. The principles must
consider what happens if the target state makes the request and
provides sufficient evidence, but the territorial state interprets the
evidence differently and reaches a different conclusion. As discussed
earlier, the target state should not be entitled to entirely ignore the
territorial state's input, but neither would it be reasonable for the
territorial state to have a "veto" over target state action. 279 The
standard should reflect a position that is somewhere in between the
two extremes. Thus, the target state should be required to provide
evidence and afford an opportunity to respond, following which the
target state must in good faith consider the territorial state's response.

277.
278.

BROOKS, supra note 11, at 124-28.
There is considerable debate over this issue. See, e.g., Drone Warfare, THE

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/

projects/drone-war (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4ZW5-J32F] (archived
Feb. 17, 2019).
279. See supra Part III.E.
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For instance, if the territorial state itself has evidence that may cast a
different light on how the activity of the NSA should be understood, it
should be entitled to have that evidence reviewed and factored into the
analysis, and the target state should be obligated to so consider it.
There are far too many known examples of the United States
mistakenly killing and torturing the wrong people since 9/11 for there
to be any argument that target states always get the analysis right, or
280
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Next, we come to the inferences of unwillingness and consent,
which is an alternative to the target state explicitly seeking consent or
assistance. The treatment of these inferences is among the most
serious weaknesses of the Bethlehem Principles, and requires the
greatest revision. I would argue that since there is no explicit basis in
treaty or otherwise for self-judgment in this regard, and that the
inference is being relied upon to justify what would otherwise be a
violation of a jus cogen norm, there should at minimum be a
presumption against such unilateral inferences. Such a presumption
should be rebuttable only by satisfying significantly more stringent
standards than the other unilateral determinations. The idea that the
target state can decide on a mere "reasonable and objective basis" that
it is entitled to simply infer that the territorial state is unwilling, or
that it has implicitly consented to a use of force, makes a mockery of
the presumption that the target state must obtain consent. This is
particularly so when one considers that in practice, target states
relying on the doctrine have typically failed to provide any disclosure
expost regarding the evidence and analysis upon which these decisions
have been made. 28 1 If states are entitled to make these inferences, and
never have to explain the basis upon which they were made, it is naive
in the extreme to expect that such decisions will always be made
honestly and on valid and persuasive evidence. It is an invitation for
action on the basis of bare supposition, suspicion, and speculation, and
282
What
indeed for use of the doctrine as a pretext for ulterior motives.
then should be the standard?

280. On errors committed in the CIA torture program, see S. REP. NO. 113-288
[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Detention and Interrogation Program], at 14-17, 133 (2014).
281.
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In order for the target state to depart from the presumption that
the it must obtain consent, and instead draw any one of the three
inferences-namely: that it is too risky to request consent; that consent
has been implicitly provided; or that the territorial state is unwillingthe target state should be required to have sufficiently compelling
evidence to support the conclusion that the territorial state is implicitly
consenting, or that it is unwilling to consent, with a high probability of
correctness. And this should be on the basis of the perspective of an
objective reasonable observer. Moreover, not only should the
possession of such evidence be a condition of the state acting on such
an inference, but the target state should be required to disclose such
evidence after using force against the NSA, both to the territorial state
and to relevant international institutions. The standard should not be
merely objective and reasonable evidence that the conclusion be more
probable than not, and it should not permit the target state to merely
assert conclusions and avoid ex post disclosure of the evidence. The
same standard should apply to the inference that the territorial state
has implicitly consented, whether the evidence be of explicit consent in
the past in similar circumstances (not mere silence in the wake of past
uses of force), or documentary evidence of informal back-channel
consent in the current situation. It will be objected that such informal
back-channel consent cannot be subsequently disclosed without
embarrassing the territorial state government (or one of its agencies),
thereby undermining the very idea of informal or implicit consent. But
more harm is done to the international rule of law, and to the integrity
of the jus ad bellum regime in particular, by instances of target states
using force against territorial states on the basis of asserted implicit
consent, but in the face of explicit and loud objections and protests by
the territorial state.
A further distinction has to be made with respect to the inference
of unwillingness. It will be recalled that in Principle Eleven of the
Bethlehem Principles, a distinction is made between unwillingness
that can be established because the territorial state is "colluding" with
the NSA, and other situations in which the territorial state is
"otherwise unwilling to effectively restrain the activities of the NSA,"
which is referred to as "harboring." 2 83 The principles are not explicit
on whether both of these are subject to the unilateral "inference of
unwillingness." Is it open to the target state to infer both? Is one more
likely to be the result of an inference? Do they imply the same level of
culpability? It is not at all clear how the principles respond to such
questions. But I would argue that our understanding of the unilateral
inference of "unwillingness" should be informed by the more traditional

283.

See supra Part IID, specifically text accompanying notes 108-111.
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test for attribution in the doctrine of self-defense. It will be recalled
that the traditional test, at least as articulated by the ICJ, is that there
be sufficient evidence that the territorial state is or has been
284
The ICJ ruled
substantially involved in the activities of the NSA.
constituted
groups
armed
of
"harboring"
out the notion that the mere
acts of the
the
of
state
the
to
attribution
a sufficient nexus to support
2 85
armed groups.
It is true that the Nicaragua standard has been increasingly
challenged in the post-9/11 era. As discussed above, the Taliban's
acquiescence in al-Qaeda's actions and subsequent refusal to address
the threat was seen as being sufficient "involvement" in and ex post
"adoption" of al-Qaeda's actions to justify the use of force against
Afghanistan. 286 In the age of increased threats from more
sophisticated transnational terrorist organizations, there are certainly
good reasons to think that the traditional attribution standard in the
doctrine of self-defense may need to be modified. But even so, the
underlying rationale, namely that the territorial state must have
sufficient involvement to justify a use of force against it, does and
should continue to govern the test for attribution-and the same
rationale should inform the standards for when a target state may
infer that a territorial state is "unwilling" to address the threat posed
by an NSA. Looked at through the lens of the traditional test for
attribution, an inference of "collusion" is not so far removed from a
determination of "substantial involvement." If there is sufficiently
compelling evidence to support the conclusion, with a high probability
of accuracy, that the territorial state is "colluding" with an NSA that is
launching armed attacks, that would also likely satisfy the traditional
test for "substantial involvement," such that the actions of the NSA
could be attributed to the state for purposes of self-defense.
In contrast to collusion, however, the Bethlehem Principles' vague
definition of "harboring" is far removed from the traditional test for
attribution, and it could even cover situations that involve less
2 87
If
culpability than the "harboring" that was rejected by the ICJ.

there is to be some reconciling of the standards for "unwillingness" and
the test for "attribution," there should be more focus on the
unreasonablenessof the territorial state's unwillingness to either deal

284. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, TT 194-95 (June 27); Case Concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 106-47 (Dec. 19) (explaining sufficient evidence was not presented by
Uganda to constitute acting in self-defense against the DRC); GRAY, supra note 21, at
139-145, 226.
285. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at TT 194-95; see RUYS, supra note 3, at 528-29.
286. Letter from John Negroponte, supra note 220 (explaining the United States'
plan to exercise self-defense against al-Qaeda); see also GRAY, supra note 21, at 193-94,
199.
287. See generally Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16.
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with the threat itself or provide consent to the target state to do so.
Such unwillingness, in the face of sufficient evidence of the necessity
for action to defend against the threat, starts to move that state down
the spectrum toward the standards for traditional attribution-that is,
substantial involvement in the operations of the NSA. It may not be
"involved" in operational terms, but unwillingness to act in the face of
compelling evidence of the threat begins to implicate and involve the
territorial state in the NSA's activity in moral terms, and the concepts
of fault and blame begin to attach. But to permit the target state to
merely infer that the territorial state is "otherwise unwilling to
effectively restrain the activities of the NSA," without having first
provided it with evidence of the threat or made any direct request for
its action or consent, is to radically depart from the idea that there be
some level of involvement and culpability sufficient to justify the use
of force. I would argue that target states should only be permitted to
make inferences of "unwillingness" where there is sufficiently
compelling objective evidence to support the conclusion, with a high
probability of accuracy, that the territorial state is "colluding" with or
substantially involved in the operations of an NSA. In the absence of
such evidence, the request for consent must be made and rejected in
order to ground the determination of unwillingness.
Finally, given this requirement that there be some level of
involvement and thus culpability, which is qualitatively and morally
different from a mere inability to prevent the operations of the NSA,
the doctrine should be revised not only to reflect this distinction on
unwillingness, but also on the issue of inability. As explained in Part
III above, the doctrine cannot be understood to justify the use of force
against a territorial state based solely on its inability to prevent NSA
attacks. Granted, from the target state's perspective, it may make little
difference whether the territorial state is "unwilling" or "unable," so
long as the armed attacks continue to rain down upon its head. But
from the perspective of whether the territorial state has done
something to forfeit its right to full respect for its sovereignty, the
difference is salient. 2 88 Thus, mere inability to deal with the threat
posed by an NSA should not be grounds for a use of force against a
state. The onus is on the target state to approach the unable territorial
state for consent to take action. It is only when the state that is unable
to deal with the threat posed by an NSA also refuses its consent to
allow the target state to do so that it becomes "unwilling," such that
that the use of force may be justified against the NSA and the
territorial state in which it is operating as an exercise of self-defense.

288.

See supra text accompanying notes 229-231.
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In essence then, the "unwilling or unable" doctrine should be more
properly understood as the "unwilling" doctrine.
C. Minimum Good Faith Standardfor All Self-Judgment
In addition to the foregoing argument that there should be some
differentiation in the standards that apply to the different
determinations that the doctrine authorizes the target state to make,
there is also an argument that all of these determinations should be
additionally subject to a robust and well-developed good faith
standard. The Bethlehem Principles themselves suggest the
application of a good faith standard-Principle Ten ends with the
admonition that "[w]here consent is required, all reasonable good faith
289
Strangely, it only explicitly
efforts must be made to obtain consent."
is actually requested,
consent
when
requirement
faith
imposes a good
by the target state.
made
being
are
inferences
and not when unilateral
applied to those
basis"
objective
and
"reasonable
But the language
faith. Yet the
good
of
element
an
suggest
also
determinations does
good faith
of
the
nature
the
explain
to
principles do not go further
particularly
decisions,
unilateral
these
standard that should govern all
those that depart from the presumption of requesting either assistance
or consent. In suggesting that these determinations all should be
subject to a good faith standard, it is important to unpack that
ubiquitous concept and establish what precisely it should mean in this
context. In thinking about what that should entail, it is helpful to
examine other areas of international law in which the exclusive
exercise of self-judgment is understood to be subject to a robust and
well-developed standard of good faith. Such good faith requirements
operate to both limit the discretion of the state engaged in selfjudgment and provide a standard for an ex post assessment of the
validity of the judgment made.
One area in which this has been examined in some detail is that
of investor-state arbitration under the terms of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs). Many BITs include provisions that allow the state to
depart from its obligations for reasons of national security,
290
maintenance of public order, or to respond to some other emergency.
Such provisions are also common in the many bilateral friendship,
commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties concluded in the period just

289. Bethlehem Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 16, at 776.
290. See generally, e.g., Jirgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International
Law: Security, Public Order and FinancialCrisis (Jean Monnet Prog. Working Paper
No. 06/08, 2008).
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after World War II. 291 They are commonly referred to as "nonprecluded measures" provisions (NPMs). Many such NPMs include
language indicating that the state is not precluded from taking
measures (which would otherwise violate the treaty) that it "considers
necessary" in order to protect its national security and other vital
interests.

29 2

This language is intended, so the argument goes, to signal

that such determinations are the exclusive preserve of the state, and
not subject to challenge by the investor or the investor's home state (in
the case of BITs), nor subject to judicial review. 2 93 This immunity from
second guessing and judicial review is argued to flow from the fact that
this right to exercise self-judgment is explicitly provided for in the
treaty, and is thus quite distinct from customary international law
defenses under the law of state responsibility. 294 In this sense, the
exercise of self-judgment pursuant to NPMs in BITs and FCNs is
afforded the greatest deference, permitting states to unilaterally make
decisions without condition or oversight. 295 And yet, even here, it has
been argued that the exercise of such judgment is bounded by, and
subject to institutional review on the basis of, the requirements of good
faith. 29 6 What is more, while no single test for assessing good faith has
been generally accepted,2 97 there are two minimum requirements that
have been widely recognized. 298
This minimum two-part test for good faith requires that (i) the
state engage in honest and fair dealing in the exercise of self-judgment;
and (ii) the state have a rational basis for the judgment that is made.
Beginning with the first prong of the test, the idea that states must in

291. Such FCN treaties were the basis for the cases in both Nicaraguaand the Oil
Platforms cases. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27); Case Concerning
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. Rep. 1 (Dec. 19).
292. William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretationand Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 311 (2008); see also
Michael D. Nolan & Frdd6ric Sourgens, The Limits of Discretion? Self-Judging
Emergency Clauses in International Investment Agreements, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2009-2010 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010).

293. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 292, at 371 ("It is difficult to subject
highly policy-relevant terms like public order, health and morality, or essential security
interests, to judicial evaluation by an ad hoc tribunal in the same way as other, more
technical legal terms, such as "most-favored-nation" treatment.").
294. Id. at 373.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 377.
297.

See generally JOHN O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991).

298.

Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 292, at 379-81.
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good faith act honestly and fairly in performing treaty obligations is
simply an essential component of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. 299 The 1935 Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties articulates this aspect of good faith in these terms:
[t]he obligation to fulfill in good faith a treaty engagement requires that its
stipulations be observed in their spirit as well as according to their letter, and
that what has been promised be performed without evasion or subterfuge,
300
honestly, and to the best of the ability of the party which made the promise.

Thus, in the investor state context, it has been argued that it is open
to review whether the state has acted honestly and to the best of its
ability in invoking an NPM clause. Where there is evidence that the
state has used the NPM as a pretext for ulterior motives, or where the
connection between the state action and the alleged national security
rationale is tenuous, it is open for a tribunal to decide that the
30 1
invocation of the NPM was not undertaken in good faith.
The second element of the test shifts the focus from the motive and
honesty underlying the decision-making process to the objective
grounds for the judgment made, requiring that there be an objectively
30 2
This is the
rational basis for the decision made in the circumstances.
commonly understood reasonableness test, which requires that a
reasonable person in the circumstances of the decision maker, with the
information available at the time, could have reasonably reached the
same conclusion. Such a good faith test has been applied in contexts
other than the BIT and FCN context. It was considered by the ICJ, for
instance, in a case involving a bilateral agreement for the provision of
judicial assistance, in Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in
303
CriminalMatters (Djiboutiv. France).
How should this good faith test apply in the context of the
unwilling or unable doctrine, and moreover, what is the legal basis for
such a requirement? To begin with the first question, in the
circumstances we are addressing here, the good faith requirement
would arguably apply to both the initial determination that selfjudgment is appropriate, as well as to the exercise of judgment on the
various substantive issues in question. For instance, if the target state
determines that it need not seek consent from the territorial state
because the risk is too high or because it has concluded that the
territorial state is colluding with the NSA, that preliminary

299. O'CONNOR, supra note 297.
300. Research in InternationalLaw, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 981 (Supp. 1935).
301. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 292, at 379.
302. Id. at 380.
303. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. Fr.),
Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 939, ¶ 145 (June 4). For analysis of the case, see Robyn Briese
& Stephan Schill, Djibouti v. France: Self-Judging Clauses Before the International
Court of Justice, 10 MELB. J. INTL L. 308, 308 (2009).
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determination should be subject to a good faith requirement. But in
addition, the good faith test should operate to govern, and be the basis
for the subsequent substantive assessment, that: (i) an NSA poses a
threat of armed attack; (ii) the threat is imminent and that the use of
force in self-defense is thus necessary to respond to it; and (iii) the
territorial state is unwilling to either take action or consent to the
target state doing so. Each of these judgments should be honestly and
fairly reached, and each conclusion should be based on reasonable and
objective evidence. What is more, these requirements further imply
that there must be some degree of disclosure, at least after the fact, so
as to permit an assessment of honesty and reasonableness. And these
should be understood as threshold minimum requirements, before
applying the differentiated standards discussed above, some of which
impose higher evidentiary standards and higher probabilities of
accuracy.
Turning to the second question, regarding the legal basis for a
good faith requirement in these circumstances, this would appear to be
less obvious than in the investor-state or FCN treaty context. This is
because in the latter situation there are specific treaty provisions that
provide for non-precluded measures, some of which explicitly reserve
to the state the right to unilaterally decide when the provision is to
apply.3 0 4 These, it has been argued, are clearly subject to the good faith
requirement in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 30 5 and to the general principle of good faith that is part of the
law of treaties.30 6 It might be objected that there are no such specific
treaty provisions governing the judgments at issue in the context of the
unwilling or unable doctrine, and thus no Article 26 good faith
requirement can be said to apply. This objection could of course cut two
ways, since it is the explicit language of the NPMs in BITs and FCN
treaties that confers the right of self-judgment upon states, and so the
absence of any such treaty authority could be said to militate against
claims of a legal authority for target states to unilaterally make all the
determinations at issue here. Indeed, this second argument is
supported by language in the Nicaraguajudgment that suggests that
the unilateral invocation of NPMs will be afforded less deference in the
absence of explicit treaty language signaling a state's reservation of
the right to make such unilateral decisions.3 0 7 But assuming for the

304. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 292, at 324-29 (explaining the
different countries that have adopted non-preclusive measures as well as the language
of these measures).
305. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
306. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 292, at 379-81.
307. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, T 141 (June 27).

456

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:387

moment that we agree that the target state has the authority to
exercise self-judgment in making some or all of these determinations,
the principle of good faith in the law of treaties would then arguably
still apply.
First, while there are no specific NPM-type provisions at issue
here, the determinations are being made in relation to the exercise of
a right under the UN Charter. The implicit claim of the unwilling or
unable doctrine-that the target state is entitled to unilaterally make
a number of key determinations regarding the justification for the use
of force against NSAs in a nonconsenting state-is based on an
interpretation of the treaty right of self-defense provided for in Article
51 of the UN Charter, and the related principle of customary
international law. 308 That being so, it follows that the unilateral
determinations so authorized by Article 51 must be similarly subject
to the principle of good faith provided for in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, in much the same way as the selfjudgments authorized by NPMs in BITs and FNCs. And to the extent
that the parallel doctrine of self-defense in customary international
law is also said to similarly authorize these unilateral determinations,
then the parallel obligation to perform customary international law
309
obligations in good faith would apply.
This may lead to the objection that if the foregoing argument is
correct, then it must also follow that the "normal" self-judgments
undertaken in the course of the exercise of self-defense against another
state-that is, that the state is the victim of an actual or imminent
armed attack, and that a use of force is necessary to respond to such
attacks-would also be subject to good faith requirements. The short
answer to this objection is simply "yes, that is correct." While it has not
been the explicit focus of the ICJ decisions regarding the doctrine of
self-defense, there can be little question that the determinations of the
defending state are subject to the requirement that the decisions be
honestly made, and that they be rationally made on the basis of
objective evidence. The debates surrounding the legitimacy of actual
claims of justifiable self-defense frequently center on questions of
whether the defending state had a legitimate purpose or was using selfdefense as a pretext to disguise nefarious motives, and whether the
defending state had a reasonable basis for determining that it was
under attack-reflecting precisely the elements of the good faith

308. See id. TT 175, 177 (discussing the close overlap of treaty and custom as it
relates to the doctrine of self-defense).
309. On the link between customary international law obligations and rights and
the requirement to preform them in good faith, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 1, ¶ 85 (Feb. 20); Nuclear Tests
Case (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20).
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test.310 What is more, as discussed earlier, in the operation of the
broader doctrine of self-defense, there is typically an expectation that
the defending state will provide disclosure of its reasons and the
evidence upon which its decisions were made.a3 1 There is always the
prospect of ex post review, if not in the ICJ, then in the court of public
opinion in the international community.31 2
D. Transparency and Accountability
This last point brings us back to the issue of transparency and
accountability. There has been a widely noted lack of transparency
surrounding the American drone-based targeted killing policy. 313
Indeed, it has been shrouded in secrecy. For many years the US
government would not even confirm that it was engaging in targeted
killing, and even now the legal arguments, rules of engagement,
evidentiary standards, and many other aspects of the policy remain
classified. 314 There have been increasing arguments that greater
transparency and accountability are essential to the legality of the
operations against NSAs more generally. 315 The arguments for
transparency and accountability have been specifically made with
respect to IHL and international human rights law aspects of targeted

310. See, e.g., FRANCK, supranote 21, at 53-108; RUYS, supra note 3, at 83-98. For
typical analysis of the ICJ into the validity of claims of self-defense, see Nicaragua,1986
I.C.J. Rep. TT 229-38.
311. See sources cited supra note 239.
312. See sources cited supra note 240; see also generally U.K. COMM. OF PRIVY
COUNSELLORS,

THE

REPORT

OF

THE

IRAQ

INQUIRY

(2016),

https://ia800406.us.archive.org/0/items/ChilcotReportOneVolume/ChilcotReportOneVol
ume.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFM8-YSJC] (archived Mar. 13, 2019).
313. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 11, 104-28; CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS:
INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY chs. 6, 9 (2015); THE DRONE MEMOS, supra note

281, at 23-35.
314. What has been disclosed include S. REP. NO. 113-7 (2013); US LEGAL AND
POLICY FRAMEWORKS, supra note 2; DoJ White Paper, supra note 71; OLC AL-AULAQI
MEMO, supra note 148; PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST
TERRORIST TARGETS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE

HOSTILITIES
(May
22,
2013),
https://fas.org/irp/offdoes/ppd/ppg-procedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SPN-339T] (archived Feb. 17, 2019).
315. Ben Emmerson, Third Annual Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
CounteringTerrorism, T 35, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013); BROOKS, supra note 11,
at 34; NILS MELZER, HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE USAGE OF DRONES AND

UNMANNED ROBOTS IN WARFARE 37 (2013); Alston CIA, supra note 176, at 308. For my
addition to these arguments, see Craig Martin, A Means-Method Paradox and the
Legality of Drone Strikes in Armed Conflict, 19 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 142, 152-54 (2015).
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killing operations. 316 These claims are grounded in treaty provisions
that implicitly require transparency for purposes of monitoring
compliance, and accountability in the form of preliminary ex post
assessment of all operations, followed by thorough investigation of
those actions that raise questions of lawfulness. 317 But similar
arguments should apply to the jus ad bellum aspects of operations
NSAs in nonconsenting states. Transparency and
against
accountability are integral to the very essence of the rule of law, since
the assessment of fair implementation of, compliance with, and
enforcement of the law is impossible without both. The good faith
obligations considered above, as well as the differentiated higher
standards articulated to govern each of the determinations made by
the target state, all contemplate and require the possibility of ex post
assessment of whether target states have made the decisions leading
to such operations honestly, and on the basis of the requisite level of
evidence, satisfying the probability of accuracy required by the
particular standard in question. The increased standards that I have
argued for would require disclosure in order for the international
community to monitor compliance, and for a more formal process of
procedural review in the event of a challenge to the legality of a use of
force.
In concluding this discussion of self-judgment and the
differentiated standards that should apply to the target state's
unilateral determinations, it may be helpful to distill and summarize
here the standards that should apply. There are four decisions
implicated, namely whether: (i) the threat posed rises to the level of an
armed attack; (ii) a use of force in response is necessary (which may
require a determination of imminence); (iii) the territorial state has
explicitly refused assistance or consent (explicit unwillingness); and
(iv) the target state may infer, and does infer, that the territorial state
is implicitly consenting, or is unwilling to consent (an alternative to
option (iii)). All of these determinations, as forms of self-judgment, are
subject to a minimum standard of good faith, requiring honest dealing
and a reasonable objective basis for decisions. But they are also subject
to further differentiated standards.
Decisions as to armed attack and necessity are similar to a stateon-state attack, but affirmative determinations are not sufficient to
justify the use of force-either consent or unwillingness is also
required. There should be a presumption that target states will
explicitly seek assistance or consent from territorial states. The
determination of explicit unwillingness requires that the target state:
(a) make disclosure to the territorial state, providing sufficiently
compelling evidence to demonstrate that its determination that the

316. Alston CIA, supra note 176, at 310, 317.
317. See, e.g., Emmerson, supranote 315 (discussing the principle of accountability
in international human rights law).
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NSA poses a risk of imminent armed attack, which makes the use of
force necessary, is very likely accurate; and (b) to meaningfully consult
with the territorial state, giving reasonable and good faith
consideration to alternative views and evidence the territorial state
may share.
There should be a presumption against unilateral inferences of
either consent or unwillingness. Rebutting this presumption requires
that the target state have sufficiently compelling evidence to support
that conclusion with a high probability of correctness, from the position
of an objective and reasonable person, and it should be required to
disclose this evidence ex post to justify the action. In the event of
inferring "unwillingness," the test is "collusion," "substantial
involvement," or "adoption," in line with the established jus ad bellum
attribution test, not mere "harboring." And finally, the inability of the
territorial state to address the threat, by itself and without denial of
consent (and thus unwillingness), cannot justify a use of force by the
target state. All of these standards require greater transparency and
accountability, and the inferences of unwillingness or consent, in
particular, require the target state to provide significant ex post
disclosure.

V. CONCLUSION

Out of the ashes of two catastrophic world wars, the United
Nations system was designed with the primary objective of enhancing
international peace and security. The modern jus ad bellum regime
was developed at the core of this system for the purpose of reducing the
scourge of war among states. Notwithstanding the prevalence of civil
wars and insurgencies in recent years, the system has been more
successful than is often realized-so successful perhaps that we have
become complacent about the risk of armed conflict among powerful
states.3 18 Yet at a time when the entire system of international law and
institutions is under strain, and instability in the relations among the
great and emerging powers is increasing, we should not be too
sanguine about this risk of war, or indifferent to threats to the legal
regime that was designed to reduce that risk.
The unwilling or unable doctrine, embodied and embraced in the
form of the Bethlehem Principles, poses just such a risk to the jus ad
bellum regime. While the doctrine is relied upon for the narrow
purpose of using force against NSAs within the territory of
nonconsenting states, primarily as an aspect of counterterrorism

318.

See generally HATHEWAY & SHAPRO, supra note 23.
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operations, it is claimed to be part of the doctrine of self-defense in the
jus ad bellum regime. The doctrine perverts the concept of imminence,
and distorts the definition of armed attack, in ways that would lower
the threshold conditions for the justifiable use of force in self-defense
for all purposes, not just against NSAs in nonconsenting states. This is
exacerbated by implications that the law of state responsibility could
bolster claims of justification for the use of force in ways that confuse
the relationship between jus ad bellum and the law of state
responsibility, and again cause confusion regarding the justification for
the use of force. Similarly, aspects of the doctrine destabilize the wellestablished relationship between the jus ad bellum and IHL regimes,
weakening both in the process. Finally, by providing weak standards
to govern when the target state may make unilateral determinations
as to the necessity for the use of force, and the consent or unwillingness
of the territorial state regarding such use of force, the doctrine grossly
over-privileges the interests of the powerful target states at the
expense of the rights and interests of typically weaker territorial
states. The perception that the law is being developed yet again to
instrumentally serve the interests of the powerful states only serves to
further erode the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum regime and the
international rule of law more generally. This perception is
exacerbated by the fallacious claims that the doctrine has achieved the
status of customary international law, on the basis of the practice of a
handful of powerful Western states.
Having said all of this, it must be recognized that states are
unlikely to accept the proposition that they cannot use force against
NSAs that pose a legitimate threat to their national security simply
because the state in which they are operating is unwilling to provide
consent. The efforts to develop the unwilling or unable doctrine into a
more robust and law-based set of principles, so as to create a more
realistic and substantive framework to govern the use of force against
NSAs in nonconsenting states, are to be applauded. But those efforts
have been insufficient, given the problems addressed above. The
doctrine can and must be brought into greater compliance with the
established principles of the jus ad bellum regime. And this can be done
without overly weakening the effectiveness of the doctrine in
addressing the real threat of transnational terrorism. Several of the
more problematic aspects of the doctrine, such as those perverting the
concept of imminence and distorting the definition of armed attack, can
be adjusted without nullifying the core operation of the doctrine.
Similarly, the establishment of differentiated and more stringent
standards for governing the self-judgment of target states in
determining the necessity and justification for the use of force would
not preclude the operation of the doctrine. These adjustments will of
course shift some of the risks, and provide a greater balance as between
the rights and interests of target states and territorial states. But it
will also reduce the risk of error, increase the legitimacy of the
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doctrine, and diminish the very real threat that the current
formulation of the doctrine poses to the jus ad bellum regime. Just as
this Article was going to press, India responded to a terrorist suicide
bombing by conducting air strikes against NSA targets within
Pakistan, which India claimed had been at best unwilling to suppress
the terrorist groups.3 1 9 One of India's planes was shot down. The world
held its breath at the prospect of war between nuclear-armed states,
an escalation facilitated in part by operation of the unwilling or unable
doctrine. This is not to trivialize or dismiss the very real risk posed by
transnational terrorism-but efforts to reduce that risk cannot
displace all other considerations. At the end of the day, there has to be
a recognition that a doctrine developed to address the narrow and
specific threat posed by transnational terrorism cannot be allowed to
undermine the regime designed to maintain international peace and
security. War among states poses far greater risks than that posed by
sporadic terrorist attacks.
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